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Academic freedom is an important component of a public university, but is it
valued enough to warrant more First Amendment constitutional protection for
academic personnel than for other public employees? This Article considers
this question in the context of academic freedom as a means of protecting the
rights of academic personnel to speak out on matters involving teaching,
research, and service-some of which may be matters of public concern. For
example, suppose faculty members, through faculty-governance procedures,
return a vote indicating they have no confidence in the university
administration based on its spending priorities.1 Will those faculty members
voting for or against the question be protected from retaliation in the name of
academic freedom? 2 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme Court
held that governmental employees who speak out pursuant to job
responsibilities are not protected from employer discipline, based on that
speech, by the First Amendment.3 Undoubtedly, there is tension between
Garcettiand academic freedom, but to date very few cases
have mentioned this
4
tension, let alone provided a means of accommodation.
It is well established that the government may not retaliate against a public
employee for speech protected by the First Amendment. 5 However the First
Amendment contains no express recognition of academic freedom; 6 rather,

1. See Martin Salazar, Faculty Decisively Votes No Confidence, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb.
27, 2009, at A 1-2.
2. Cases have reached varying results, yet professional academic freedom has long been
thought to encompass a right to comment and criticize-within reason-university policy. See
infra notes 208-95.
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
4. Leonard M. Niehoff, PeculiarMarketplace: Applying Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Public
Higher Education Context, 35 J.C. & U.L. 75, 92 (2008). Cases usually offer the advantage of
concrete facts and an adversarial presentation with appellate review and a written outcome.
Although most cases concerning academic freedom are resolved through a university
administrative process, the university counsel plays an important role in advising the institution,
providing an awareness of faculty rights and responsibilities. See Robert M. O'Neil, University
Governance

and Academic

Freedom,

in

COMPETING

CONCEPTIONS

OF

ACADEMIC

GOVERNANCE: NEGOTIATING THE PERFECT STORM 177, 194-98 (William G. Tiemey ed., 2004).
While cases can be precedential, one cannot overlook the importance of the operative facts
developed, the arguments made, and the decisions rendered in the academic freedom context;
persuasive value is often a function of actual case holdings-rather than observations-that can
be generalized.
5. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987) ("Even though McPherson was
merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for
no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for
exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. 1; see also David M. Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual"
and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 227, 237 (1990) [hereinafter Rabban, Functional Analysis] ("Fitting academic freedom
within the rubric of the first amendment is in many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The
term 'academic freedom,' in obvious contrast to 'freedom of the press,' is nowhere mentioned in
the text of the first amendment.").
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such freedom is the product of constitutional interpretation and is a "special
concern" of the First Amendment. 7 At its core, professional academic freedom
for college and university teachers involves the following: (1) freedom in
research and publication, (2) freedom in classroom discussion concerning the
curriculum, and (3) freedom to speak or write as citizens. 8 Universities exist
for the common 9good, which "depends upon the free search for truth and its
free exposition." As a necessity to that search, academic freedom exists not
only to protect the rights of faculty in teaching, but also the rights of students
in learning. ° Closely related to meaningful academic freedom is tenure, an
employment status that protects academic employees from dismissal absent
serious misconduct, incompetence, or financial exigency. 11 Tenure promotes
academic freedom by providing job security to an employee after the employee
has held the position for a probationary period; tenured faculty may be
terminated only for cause with attendant due process. 12 Thus, while academic
7. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
8. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors & Ass'n of Am. Colls., 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 3 (2006), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B33033D3-4A51-B534-CEEOC7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenu
re.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENT]. This represents a statement of
professional academic freedom that the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
has been instrumental in applying, and it certainly has influenced the development of
constitutional academic freedom. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An UnhurriedHistoricalReview, 53 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 80-82 (1990). Academic freedom also has been defined more narrowly
as "a personal liberty to pursue the investigation, research, teaching, and publication of any
subject as a matter of professional interest without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction,
save only upon adequate demonstration of inexcusable breach of professional ethics in the
exercise of that freedom." WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom
and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71

(Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1972) [hereinafter VAN ALSTYNE, Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom].
9. 1940 STATEMENT, supranote 8, at 3.
10. Id; see also Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 545
F.3d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("Academic freedom is not an easy concept
to grasp, and its breadth is far from clear. It has generally been understood to protect and foster
the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students and the serious
pursuit of scholarship among members of the academy."); Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251,
1257 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The principle of academic freedom abjures state interference with
curriculum or theory as antithetical to the search for truth."), aff'd, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
11. Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Mayberry v.
Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 514 (4th Cir. 1981). The AAUP also envisions the discontinuance of a
department or program of study due to educational considerations, as well as physical or mental
disability demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, as bases for dismissal. Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Professors, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM &

TENURE 3-4 (2007), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/43B77A60-BA80-4155-B61B-FF76743
B5048/0/RecommendedlnstitutionalRegulationsonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
12. Grimes v. E. Ill. Univ., 710 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The purpose of tenure is to
protect academic freedom-the freedom to teach and write without fear of retribution for
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freedom and tenure are distinct, and all faculty members have the right to
academic freedom, those without tenure are more vulnerable to1 3adverse
employment action based on political factors or managerial discretion.
Lay boards govern most American educational institutions, and academic
freedom developed as a means of providing some balance and protection for
the faculty. 14 While professional standards concerning academic freedom
often inform
the debate, constitutional academic freedom is a narrower
15
concept.
Although federal and state courts have noted principles of academic freedom
in their opinions, 6 such principles rarely form the sole basis of the decisions;
instead, academic freedom simply serves as a policy consideration supporting
the decisions. 7 At times, academic freedom involves a balancing of an
academic's right to exchange ideas with an academic institution's right to set
policy and conduct operations. 18 More often than not, the balance is struck in
favor of the university when university policies or directives are challenged by
faculty. Thus, while courts often defer to academic freedom, they are usually
expressing heterodox ideas-and it is faculty who engage in teaching and writing."); 1940
STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 4.

13. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom Without Tenure 1 (Am. Ass'n for Higher Educ., New
Pathways Working Paper Series # 5, 1997) [hereinafter Byrne, Academic Freedom Without
Tenure].
14. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251, 273-79 (1989) [hereinafter Byrne, Special Concern]; Matthew W. Finkin, On
"Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 825-29 (1983) [hereinafter Finkin,
"Institutional" Academic Freedom]; Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two
Definitions ofAcademic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1278 (1988).
15. Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 6, at 237-39, 255 (noting that fitting academic
freedom within the rubric of the First Amendment is challenging and suggesting differences
between professional and constitutional academic freedom).
16. See, e.g., Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2007); Taggart v. Drake Univ., 549
N.W.2d 796, 800 (Iowa 1996).
17. Several circuits have concluded that academic freedom must be tied to a protected free
speech or associational right in the context of protected speech. See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to
Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) ("The very notion of academic freedom-as a concept distinct from the actual textual
provisions of the First Amendment-is elusive."); Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253,
1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a claim that a professor's comments concerning university
operations should enjoy more protection due to academic freedom and concluding that such an
argument would elevate academic personnel above other governmental workers); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Although we recognize and apply this
principle [of academic freedom] in our analysis, we do not view it as constituting a separate right
apart from the operation of the First Amendment within the university setting."); Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Though we are mindful of the invaluable role
academic freedom plays in our public schools, particularly at the post-secondary level, we do not
find support to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.").
18. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237-38 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring);
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (noting that academic
freedom thrives on exchange of ideas and independent decision-making by the institution).
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deferring to an institutional academic freedom as opposed to an individual
academic freedom. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that academic
freedom is exclusively an institutional right for two reasons. First, the roots of
American academic freedom are in the faculty; as developed, "academic
freedom stood for the freedom of the academic, not for the freedom of the
academy."' 9
Second, knowledge creation and teaching remain largely
individual endeavors, and it is doubtful that a university could succeed if
administrators attempted to force faculty
members to research a particular
20
topic or come to a particular conclusion.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme Court announced that
"when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline. ' 21 Thus, the Court vindicated managerial prerogative, while
providing a disincentive for an employee to speak out about job-related
matters. In dissent, Justice David Souter argued that this new rule conflicted
with academic freedom because academic personnel lecture and produce
scholarly work-activities long thought to be protected by academic
freedom-in accordance with their official duties.
In response, the Court
explained that it was not deciding whether the new rule was applicable to
"speech related to scholarship or teaching." 23 Consequently, to understand the
boundaries of academic freedom, one must also look to the framework that was
in place prior to Garcetti: speech by a public employee was protected if it (1)
involved a matter of public concern and (2) outweighed the public employer's
justification for limiting that speech. 24
This Article considers how the limitation established by Garcetti applies in
the academic context given the varied responsibilities of university faculty.
Part I considers the nature and contours of constitutional academic freedom in
a public university setting and concludes that the doctrine of academic freedom
has important limitations, particularly with respect to many academic
responsibilities. This Part utilizes the framework suggested by Justice Felix
Frankfurter when he explained the federal judicial concept of academic
freedom: "who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who

19. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1284.
20. Rabban, Functional Analysis, supra note 6, at 242 ("It makes no sense to expect
professors to engage in critical inquiry and simultaneously to allow punishment for its exercise.").
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
22. Id. at 438-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
24. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-52 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968). A public employee must also establish causation and show that the
protected speech was a motivating factor in any adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). A public employer could defend on
the basis that the same action would have been taken regardless of the speech. Id.
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may be admitted to study." 25 Against this backdrop, Part I discusses the
constitutional protection afforded employee speech and considers whether
public university employees should enjoy greater protection. Finally, Part III
concludes that while academic freedom may be best protected by tenure, other
mechanisms apart from federal constitutional protection may offer some
shelter, including state constitutional and statutory law, freedom of contract
and collective bargaining provisions, and academic policy.
I. THE NATURE AND CONTOURS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The Supreme Court began its development of the concept of constitutional
academic freedom with a series of loyalty cases, which make clear that, absent
unusual circumstances, the state cannot condition faculty selection and
retention on ideology or loyalty.26 Subsequently, a decidedly institutional view
27
In cases in which individual faculty
of academic freedom has emerged.
25. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
26. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) (noting that New
York's teacher loyalty laws, by impinging on freedom of association, had a "stifling effect on the
academic mind"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (noting that requiring a teacher,
hired annually, to list every associational tie was overbroad and "[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools");
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236, 247 (plurality opinion) (noting that compelling a lecturer at a state
university to disclose his membership in subversive organizations was an invasion of his
academic freedom); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (holding that an Oklahoma
loyalty oath that was required of state-employed educators and that barred association with listed
organizations violated due process). AAUP's recognition of academic freedom predates the
Court's recognition of the concept. See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1915 DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM & ACADEMIC TENURE 291, http://www.aaup.org/NR/
(last visited
rdonlyres/A6520A9D-OA9A-47B3-B550-CO06B5B224E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf
Oct. 16, 2009).
27. By institutional academic freedom, the authors mean policies and procedures ultimately
attributed to the governing authority of the university or its administrators, recognizing that such
policies and procedures often, but not always, involve faculty participation on one or more levels
and that faculty are hardly monolithic in their views. Compare NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 686 (1980) (noting-in the context of determining that faculty were managerial employees
and thus not entitled to collective bargaining-that faculty had absolute authority over academic
matters, course selection and staffing, student admission and retention, and other matters), and
NLRB v. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d 616, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that faculty had authority in
many areas of administrative decision-making), with Loretto Heights Coll. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d
1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing limited power of faculty members, who, although
involved in governance, were constrained by the administration, which was the primary decisionmaker). Of course, while Yeshiva University may represent the zenith of faculty authority at one
private university, the fact remains that, usually, a governing board has ultimate authority over
most decisions, although responsibility is sometimes shared. See George Keller, A Growing
Quaintness: TraditionalGovernance in the Markedly New Realm of U.S. Higher Education, in
COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 158, 168 (2004) (noting that although
many things have changed since the AAUP's 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and
Universities, a board of trustees remains the ultimate legal authority over a university, acting
through a president as chief executive officer); Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, STATEMENT ON
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members challenged tenure and promotion decisions, courts often decide in
favor of the institutions, allowing them to rely on their own concepts of
academic freedom when shaping their faculties.28
At the same time,
institutions may not discriminate in that process,
nor
may
they retaliate in
29
response to an exercise of constitutional rights.
This institution-favored view of academic freedom permeates almost every
facet of academic operations. Thus, admissions policies may favor certain
groups over others to encourage diversity, notwithstanding the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Such student selection policies,
however, are subject to limitations requiring them to be narrowly tailored and
of fixed duration.31 Moreover, curriculum design is another area in which the
right of the academic institution is very strong, and the institution may insist
that faculty (1) stay on topic, (2) employ authorized teaching methods, and (3)
32
assign grades in accordance with administrative policy and direction.
Notably, though, universities are made up of academic personnel who often
give voice to the policies that are later challenged.
Thus, constitutional academic freedom takes a decidedly institutional look,
so it is not surprising that the university employer may well have an advantage
when regulating employee speech. That said, given the value universities
place on free speech, such advantage may rarely be put to the test.
Additionally, public employees enjoy a First Amendment right to speak on
matters of public concern so long as they speak as citizens and not in
accordance with their job responsibilities. 33 Relying on Justice Frankfurter's
academic freedom framework, this Part explores the constitutional protections
afforded public university employees, the debate surrounding the adequacy of
those protections, and the influence of the institution in this arena.

GOVERNMENT OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 138 (1966), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/

431 ABAOA-019B-4ECD-B067-14EE8 IF37ABA/0/StatementonGovemmentofCollegesandUnive
rsities.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). A powerful argument is that Yeshiva is simply wrong; the
faculty have responsibility by virtue of their professional status, but this certainly does not
amount to managerial authority. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Patrick Shaw, Prospects for Full-Time Organizing at Private Universities and Colleges, in
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 78, 80-84 (Ernest Benjamin & Michael Mauer eds., 2006).
28. For a discussion of judicial deference to tenure decisions, see infra notes 57-66 and
accompanying text.
29. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
30. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328
(2003).
31. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-43.
32. For a discussion of an academic institution's prerogatives in curriculum design and
grading policy, see infra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
33. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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A. JudicialDevelopment ofAcademic Freedom: Who May Teach?

Judicial recognition of academic freedom began with cases involving faculty
qualifications; these decisions established that the state should not condition
faculty selection and retention on ideology or loyalty. 34 The deference shown
to the university extends not only to initial faculty selection, but also to tenure
and promotion decisions, although such decisions 35
cannot contravene antidiscrimination provisions or constitutional guarantees.
1. Loyalty Cases

The Supreme Court's recognition of academic freedom began with a series
of loyalty cases-many involving faculty qualifications-decided during the
Cold War.36 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the New Hampshire legislature
tasked the attorney general with investigating subversive activities.
As a
result, a Marxist lecturer at the University of New Hampshire was held in
contempt of court for refusing to answer questions about the content of a
lecture and certain of his political associations. 38 A four-member plurality of
the Court concluded that these events constituted an invasion of both personal
academic freedom and political expression.3 9 However, the plurality decided
the case on Fourteenth
Amendment due process grounds and not on First
40
Amendment grounds.
The plurality decided that although the legislature certainly had the power to
investigate subversive activities, it also had to use that power responsibly given
the potential impairment of First Amendment freedoms. 41 They concluded that
no nexus existed between the information sought by the legislature and the
lecturer, and equated that lack of a nexus to a lack of authority. 42 Concurring
in the result, Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
relied on First Amendment grounds, concluding that the New Hampshire court
had struck the wrong balance in weighing the state's right to self-protection
against interference with "the intellectual life of a university" and the
individual's right to political privacy.43
Justice Frankfurter's view of academic freedom is perhaps the most
encompassing and enduring, even though it was not adopted by a majority. He
34. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592-94, 609-10 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
35. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
36. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592-95; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236-37.
37. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236-37.
38. Id. at 243-45.
39. Id. at 250.
40. Id. at 254-55.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 254 ("The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the information the
Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the absence of authority.").
43. Id. at 260-61, 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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recognized the "dependence of a free society on free universities" and noted
that, in a university setting, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to
an end. 44 According to Justice Frankfurter, academic freedom includes both
the freedom to follow inquiry where it leads without governmental intervention
and the freedom "to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and
beliefs .... The concern of [a university's] scholars is not merely to add and
revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and
modifying the framework itself. '45 Although concerned with the political
autonomy of the individual, Justice Frankfurter's opinion also forms the
foundation for an institutional view of academic freedom and provides a
framework identifying four main academic freedoms: "who may teach, 46
what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."
In 1967, the Supreme Court plainly endorsed academic freedom as a First
Amendment value in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 47 In Keyishian, university
personnel refused to provide information concerning whether they were or had
been affiliated with the Communist Party or similar organizations. 48 The
requirement was part of a complicated scheme intended to prevent the
appointment and retention of state employees who had been deemed
subversive. 49 The Court stated that
[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.5 °
Thus, the Court invalidated the New York scheme as overbroad.51
Cases must be read against their facts. Sweezy and Keyishian suggest that
efforts to regulate faculty qualifications on the basis of ideology or loyalty
implicate the First Amendment and academic freedom. 52 The government may
not replace academic criteria for faculty selection and retention because this
replacement usurps and eliminates the discretion of the institution to develop
and apply such criteria.53 However, these decisions do not directly address
whether academic freedom is an individual or institutional right, or both,

44. Id. at 262.
45. Id. at 262-63.
46. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
47. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
48. Id. at 591-92.
49. Id. at 593-94.
50. Id. at 603.
51. Id. at 609.
52. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (viewing the decisions as a reaction
to content-based regulation of who may teach).
53. Id. at 198.
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because the issue simply was not before the Court in either case. 54 Moreover,
in these cases, the interest of the university in presenting diverse ideas and the
interest of individual employees in retaining their employment were aligned
against state interference, which presented an external threat to academic
freedom.
That will not always be the case. At times, the threat to academic freedom
will be internal, resulting in a faculty member challenging an institutional
decision. These are difficult cases for faculty members to win. Even though a
faculty member may have a right to advocate a particular viewpoint in his
field, the university retains the academic freedom to set the curriculum. 55 The
university, as employer, has a clear right to require the faculty to engage in
research and teaching, and the university may step in when internal tensions
hinder these objectives. 56 What is not clear is whether the university may step
in when it disagrees with the content, as opposed to the quality, of the research
on non-academic grounds. This Article addresses that issue and suggests that
such content-based regulation is likely to raise serious First Amendment

concerns.
2. Tenure and Promotion

The issue of who may teach involves another area in which the interests of
the university and the faculty member may diverge. This issue most frequently
arises in the context of the tenure and promotion process. The review process
associated with tenure necessarily implies that not every person will receive
tenure, so it is not surprising that claims for wrongful denial of tenure are
numerous. 57 Courts often mention institutional academic freedom in
upholding an institution's tenure decisions; however, academic freedom will
not be a successful defense to tenure decisions made in violation
of anti5
discrimination law or clearly established constitutional guarantees. 8
54. Cf Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REv.
907, 909-10 (2006) (suggesting that early Supreme Court cases provide little support for
individual academic freedom, because the decisions would have been the same for non-academic
public employees on account of the First Amendment).
55. Webb v. Bd. ofTrs., 167 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 1150 ("When the bulk of a professor's time goes over to fraternal warfare,
students and the scholarly community alike suffer, and the university may intervene to restore
decorum and ease tensions.").
57. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming the trial court's
decision that denial of tenure was not based on gender).
58. See, e.g., EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 145 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a court
does not sit as a "super-tenure committee"); Villanueva v. Wellesley Coll., 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st
Cir. 1991); Megill v. Bd. of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that the
jurisdictional limitations of federal courts preclude review except where denial of tenure violates
a person's constitutional rights). While courts are deferential to a university's "academic
decisions," tenure may not be denied in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights.
See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990). Nor may it be denied based
on discriminatory reasons, although courts often find that a university's unfavorable assessment

2009]

Academic Freedom and Public University Faculty

Academic institutions are thought to have particular competence in judging
the qualifications of faculty. 59 As one court observed, "[c]ourts have wisely
recognized the importance of allowing universities to run their own affairs (and
to make their own mistakes). To do otherwise threatens the diversity of
thought, speech, teaching, and research both within and among universities
upon which free academic life depends." 60 Tenure decisions involve many
subjective factors, including "academic excellence, teaching ability, creativity,
contributions to the university community, rapport with students and
colleagues, and other factors" that may not be precisely quantified. 61 Thus,
institutional decisions concerning tenure and promotion, including decisions
involving research quality and productivity, are usually upheld.62 After all, a

of a candidate's academic qualifications provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
denial of tenure. Qamhiyah v. Iowa State Univ., 566 F.3d 733, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2009);
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41-42, 47 (2d Cir. 2000); Kumar v. Bd. of Trs., 774
F.2d 1, 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (Campbell, C.J., concurring). Additionally, academic freedom does
not insulate tenure review materials from disclosure to the authorities charged with investigating
discrimination, notwithstanding claims that the lack of confidentiality will impair the process.
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198-99 (1990).
59. Bickerstaffv. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 455 (2d Cir. 1999). Scholarship is one critical
component that institutions examine during the tenure process. See Jiminez v. Mary Washington
Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 384 (4th Cir. 1995).
60. Vargas-Figueroa v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162-63 (1st Cir. 1987).
61. Kumar, 774 F.2d at 12.
62. See Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 43 (holding that a court will not second-guess a tenure
decision given a legitimate non-discriminatory reason); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091,
1097 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987); Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 520 (4th Cir. 1981); Allworth v.
Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 202 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006); Brown v. George Washington Univ.,
802 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002).
In perhaps the most widely publicized case on academic freedom in decades, Professor Ward
Churchill obtained ajury verdict (with a nominal damages award) on his claim that the University
of Colorado had terminated him in retaliation for protected political speech. See Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Reinstatement of Employment at 26-27, Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., No. 06CV 11473 (Denver
County Dist. Ct. July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Order], available at http://law.du.edu/documents/
corporate-govemance/churchill/20090707_122722_churchill.pdf, appealfiled, No. 09-CA-1713
(Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2009). A faculty panel previously considered the matter and was
unanimous on research misconduct, but split three-to-two on the recommended sanction, with
three favoring suspension and demotion, and two favoring termination. Id. at 7-8. The university
president recommended termination, which the regents upheld following presentations by
university administrators and Professor Churchill. Id at 8. Ultimately, the trial court vacated the
jury's verdict against the defendants, which included the university and its regents, on the basis of
quasi-judicial immunity, determining that neither damages nor prospective injunctive relief was
available. Id. at 9-10, 14, 25-26.
Quasi-judicial immunity protects those serving in quasi-adjudicative functions from liability
for damages based upon their service. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978).
Although quasi-judicial immunity applies only to individual capacity claims, the trial court held
that a stipulation allowed the university and the board of regents to assert individual capacity
defenses, despite the fact that they were acting in their official capacities. Order, supra, at 4; see
also VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 502 F.3d 775, 778-79 (8th Cir. 2007). The trial court denied
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grant of tenured status should be a product of faculty judgment and should
contain adequate procedural safeguards. 63
Only where there has been
substantial and prejudicial non-compliance with the procedure or a showing of
discrimination is relief likely to be granted. 64 Although courts review cases
involving tenure and promotion on the merits, academic freedom is an
important value that counsels restraint in judging claims involving the
wrongful denial of tenure or promotion. However, to suggest that there should
be no review would be unwise. The possibility of review reinforces the need
for principled decision-making by the institution, and judicial review may
provide a remedy in appropriate cases.65 While there may be a concern that
institutional academic freedom is displaced, this concern is minor because
courts are (1) well aware of the need for institutional autonomy; (2)
experienced with claims involving allegations of improper motives and pretext;
and (3) sensitive to the principle that academic boards,
the administration, and
66
academic departments must comply with the law.
B. Who May Be Admitted to Study?
Supreme Court recognition of academic freedom was at its strongest in its
approval of a race-conscious university admissions policy over an equal
protection challenge. 67 While such policies must be narrowly tailored and of
fixed duration, the Court is willing to defer to academic judgment, at least
where the electorate has not adopted a contrary measure. 68 When it comes to

Professor Churchill's motion for reinstatement in part because it would interfere with the
university's academic freedom to define and enforce its standards of scholarship. Order, supra, at
34-35.
63. See David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1405, 1407-08, 1410-12 (1988) [hereinafter, Rabban, Faculty Autonomy] (noting that
faculty normally apply standards for scholarship and compliance with professional ethics, but that
administrators and governing boards may intervene given "compelling grounds" to suspect
deviation from such standards).
64. Loebl v. N.Y. Univ., 680 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (App. Div. 1998).
65. Unlike many employment situations, tenure presents the possibility of having the same
colleagues for decades. This possibility, along with changing academic leadership, also may
encourage treating colleagues with respect and fairness. That said, a right of review by others
may result in a decision informed by broader concerns. See O'Neil, supra note 4, at 179-185
(discussing "rare but meritorious cases" where peer judgment was overridden); Rabban, Faculty
Autonomy, supra note 63, at 1407-08.
66. Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the
Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 955, 972-73 (2006) (explaining that the
concern that courts will infringe on institutional academic freedom is overstated, because courts
are independent and well-suited to render decisions based on the evidence and assisted by legal
analysis); Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis,supra note 6, at 286-88.
67. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340-41 (2003).
68. Id. at 341-42.
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student qualifications and academic
success in a program, courts generally
69
defer to institutional judgment.
1. Student Selection: Diversity and Admissions Policies
Challenges to admissions policies by students who were not admitted are not
unusual, but academic freedom as a rationale to sustain such policies is a
relatively recent development. 70 When it comes to admitting students, the
Supreme Court has held that there may be a compelling state interest in student
71
body diversity that can justify race-conscious university admissions policies.
In finding this interest, the Court relied upon an academic freedom rationale
articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke. 72 In Bakke, the Court-through a maze of separate opinionsinvalidated a racial set-aside program that reserved a specific number of seats
in an incoming medical school class for minorities and reversed a state-court
injunction73 that would have prohibited consideration of the race of any
applicant.
In that case, Justice Powell viewed academic freedom "as a special concern
of the First Amendment" and recognized that the concept encompassed student
selection.74 Relying on an article endorsing diversity, he noted that "[t]he
atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation' . . . is widely believed to
be promoted by a diverse student body." 75 The article suggested that much
learning occurs informally and that diversity encompasses not only ethnic
76
differences, but also geographic, cultural, and gender differences.
Accordingly, a university may select those students who contribute most to an
exchange of ideas that will enrich the training and understanding of its
graduates.
Although the set-aside program violated the Fourteenth
69. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
70. This deference to academic freedom, at least in terms of applying strict scrutiny to
classifications based on race, only applies to institutions of higher education, and not to
elementary and secondary institutions. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 724-25 (2007). Notwithstanding, academic freedom has been used as a rationale
in some litigation concerning elementary and secondary schools. Asociaci6n de Educaci6n
Privada de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 11 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that
regulation requiring private schools to obtain parental approval of textbook budget and to afford
an option of buying previous edition of textbook violated academic freedom).
71. Grutter,539 U.S. at 325, 328. Grutter involved the policies of a graduate school, while
its companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, involved an undergraduate admissions scheme that was
struck down because it was not narrowly tailored; however, the Gratz Court suggested that
diversity can also be a compelling state interest in the undergraduate admissions context. Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-70 (2003).
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-18 (1978).
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75, 320; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-24.
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
75. Id. (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON
ALUMNI WEEKLY 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977)).
76. Bowen, supra note 75, at 7, 9.
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Amendment because it focused exclusively on race, race could be used as a
factor in conjunction with other factors, such as "exceptional personal talents,
unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability
to
' 77
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.
Classifications based on race run counter to the personal right of equal
protection and historically have been subject to strict scrutiny, which requires
classifications to be narrowly tailored and to further compelling state
interests. 78 Such classifications are in considerable tension with the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was designed to eliminate official discrimination. 79 The
Court applies strict scrutiny because "there is simply no way of determining
what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics." 80 Because the denial of equal treatment, rather than the denial of the
benefit itself, is sufficient to confer standing, such classifications are likely to
be challenged. 8'
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court considered a challenge by an unsuccessful
law school applicant who claimed that the University of Michigan Law
School's use of race in the admissions process gave certain minority applicants
a greater chance of admission than others with similar credentials. 2 The
university admissions policy sought to enroll a "critical mass" of students from
certain underrepresented groups to enhance classroom discussion and the
educational experience and not as a remedy for past discrimination. 83 The
Court announced that it would defer to the law school's judgment that diversity
77. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
78. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719-20
(2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
79. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996).
80. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Classifications based
on gender also receive heightened scrutiny because they often are based on stereotypes that have
no basis in actual performance; to be upheld, the classification must be substantially related to a
sufficiently important governmental interest. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87, 689 (1973) (plurality
opinion).
81. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993) ("When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of
the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the
benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The 'injury in fact' in an equal protection
case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier,
not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit."); accord ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 718-19;
Adarand,515 U.S. at 211.
82. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003).
83. Id. at 316, 319 (noting that the groups expressly included in the policy were African
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans based upon (1) historical discrimination and (2)
underrepresentation in the absence of such a policy).
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was essential to its educational mission, noting that strict scrutiny may take
into account "complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily
within the expertise of the university." 84 The Court made its academic
freedom rationale clear when it stated that "[o]ur holding today is in keeping
with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits." 85 Thus, admissions
policies stand as an important part of academic freedom and necessarily
judgments in an
incorporate the careful consideration of "complex educational
86
area that lies primarily within the expertise of a university."
Grutter contained two important limits on the academic freedom rationale in
the area of student selection: narrow tailoring and fixed duration. 87 An
admissions policy cannot reserve a set number of seats for minority students;
the policy must be flexible. 88 Moreover, while race may be used as a "plus
factor," the policy must allow individual consideration of every applicant. In
sum, race may not be given such weight as to make it the decisive factor.
Thus, the Court invalidated the undergraduate admissions policy at the
University of Michigan, which granted one-fifth of the necessary points for
90
admission based on an applicant's status as an underrepresented minority.
Although the university might have had a strong interest in diversity based
upon its academic judgment, it could not escape the requirement of narrow
tailoring. As a consequence, race-neutral alternatives must be considered, and
the policy may not "unduly harm" those who are not members of the preferred
racial groups. 9 ' In this regard, the Court noted various experiments with
alternative approaches that had been conducted in California, Florida, and
Washington, where state law prohibited racial preferences in admission
decisions. 92 Additionally, consistent with the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ultimately eliminate racial discrimination, such policies must
have end points; in fact, the Court suggested that racial preferences in
admission policies should not be necessary by 2028. 93 The Court's opinion
thus instructs that academic 94freedom as a value does not subsume independent
equal protection limitations.
84. Id. at 328.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 333, 342.
88. Id. at 334.
89. Id. at 336-37.
90. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-73 (2003).
91. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339, 341.
92. Id. at 342.
93. Id. at 341-43.
94. Likewise, academic freedom does not subsume other First Amendment constraints on a
university's choices-institutional autonomy is subject to limits. For example, although a
university may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and decide how to allocate
meeting facilities for students, it may not discriminate based upon content in the absence of a
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Another important limit on academic freedom may result from the choice of
the electorate or its elected representatives. A court deferring to academic
judgment in the face of a challenge to an admissions policy containing racial
right to such a policy,
an affirmative
preferences differs from a court
.95
. . . declaring
...
even if that decision is imbued with academic judgment. This difference is
implicit in Grutter, where the Court, as part of its narrow-tailoring analysis,
recognized that a state may prohibit racial preferences in admissions. Indeed,
in December 2006, Michigan enacted a constitutional amendment prohibiting
public educational institutions from granting preferential treatment based upon
race, and other states have followed suit. 97 In fact, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had no difficulty in staying a stipulated injunction
enjoining the measure, despite claims by universities that academic freedom
was at stake. 98 The court noted that a state may end racial preferences just as it
may grant preferences based on high-school class standing or residency. 99 Any
other rule would displace legislative or initiative power to establish
compelling state interest. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). In Widmar v.
Vincent, a university made its facilities available to student groups, and the students paid a fee to
defray the costs. Id. After meeting in such facilities for four years, an evangelical Christian
group was denied meeting space based on a university regulation prohibiting use of the space for
religious worship or teaching. Id The Court had no difficulty reasoning that, having created the
forum, the university had to apply the prevailing constitutional norms. Id. at 267-68. It also
rejected the idea that equal access to university facilities available to all had the effect of
advancing religion. Id. at 273. Justice John Paul Stevens authored a concurring opinion that
suggested omitting the compelling state interest requirement and noted that "Ij]udgments of this
kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges." Id at 278-80 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The opinion for the Court demonstrates that academic freedom cannot trump other
constitutional guarantees, whether they are found in the First Amendment or elsewhere.
Similarly, in State v. Schmid, a private university's lack of standards to protect individual
expression was required to yield under the state constitution. 423 A.2d 615, 632 (N.J. 1980).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the proposition that a law
school clinical program could deny representation to a potential client solely on the basis of his
viewpoint, even if the potential client was antagonistic to the program. Wishnatsky v. Rovner,
433 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2006). The court recognized that other concerns, including the
academic freedom to select the proper cases for the program and a lawyer's professional
responsibility, may have animated the decision to deny representation and the court remanded the
case for further factual development. Id. at 612-13. The cases illustrate that institutional
academic freedom is not an absolute; at times, it will yield to other constitutional or social values.
See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 14, at 282; Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 63, at
1419-20.
95. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th Cir. 2006);
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997).
96. Grutter,539 U.S. at 342.
97. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a), (f); NEB. CONST. art. I, §
30; WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.400(1) (2008). Colorado recently defeated such a proposal in an
extremely close vote. See Ballotpedia.org, Colorado Civil Rights Initiative (2008): Election
Results, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Colorado_CivilRights-Initiative_2008 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
98. Coal. to DefendAffirmative Action, 473 F.3d at 247, 253.
99. Id. at 247.
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constitutionally permissible classifications in most matters.' 00 Provided that
such classifications are "rationally related to a legitimate state interest," such
classifications will be upheld.101
2. Student Retention: Satisfactory Academic Progress
Once students are admitted, courts have little difficulty in deferring to
institutional academic judgment about academic success or failure within a
program. Thus, where a student was dismissed without being allowed to
retake a critical examination, the Supreme Court deferred on grounds of
academic freedom. 1° 2 Given fair procedures and no impermissible factors, a
court will "not override [the decision] unless it is such a substantial departure
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment."103 In other
words, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the institution, even if
it recognizes that a different result may have been reasonable. Likewise, the
institution can insist on fidelity to curricular norms, notwithstanding challenges
from students who may disagree with those norms on First Amendment
grounds10 4 or on
the basis that the norms constitute prohibited disability
05
discrimination. 1
C. What May Be Taught and How Shall It Be Taught?
1. Staying on Topic
It seems clear that the university, as a public employer, may insist that its
academic personnel cover the subject matter that they have been assigned to
100. Coalfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 709.
101. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
102. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 224-26 (1985).
103. Id.at 225.
104. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a university could
decline to approve a student's master's thesis, which contained a "Disacknowledgments"
section); Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
junior high school teacher could refuse to accept a paper on an unapproved topic without
violating the student's First Amendment rights).
105. Students have often sought relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). A university is not
required to lower standards or substantially modify a program to accommodate a disability;
however, it must consider accommodation, and courts will generally defer to reasonable academic
judgment concerning whether a student may be accommodated. See Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979); Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (9th Cir.
1999); McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1993). This
deference is not absolute because the federal courts are the institutions charged with interpreting
and applying anti-discrimination measures. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807,
817-18 (9th Cir. 1999).
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teach and do so in a manner not offensive to the university. Indeed the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) recognizes that
"[tleachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject,
but they should be careful not to introduce 10into
their teaching controversial
6
matter which has no relation to their subject."
A good illustration is Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, where a part-time
clinical cosmetology instructor at a community college gave a gay student two
religious pamphlets condemning homosexuality and invited him to discuss the
issue. 10 7 The student complained, and the college subsequently found that the
clinical instructor had engaged in sexual harassment; the college gave a
warning to the instructor to cease proselytizing.'
The instructor's contract
was not renewed. 0 9 Characterizing the dispute as the clinical instructor's right
to speak on a matter of religious concern in the workplace, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit assumed that the topic was a matter
of public concern, but concluded that the community college had a right to
insist that discussions of religion or sexual orientation occur outside of
cosmetology classes or clinics.
Grounding its discussion in the academic
freedom of the university to set a curriculum, the court said that
[n]o college or university is required to allow a chemistry professor
to devote extensive classroom time to the teaching of James Joyce's
demanding novel Ulysses, nor must it permit a professor of
mathematics to fill her class hours with instruction on the law of
torts. Classroom or instructional speech, in short, is inevitably
speech that is part of the instructor's official duties, even though at
the same time the instructor's freedom to express her views on the
assigned course is protected."'
In other words, the interest of the employer in avoiding completely off-topic
speech that had the potential to violate its sexual harassment policy outweighed
the clinical instructor's right to engage in such speech. The court further found
that the speech disrupted the student's education
and interfered with the
2
clinical component of the course of study."
This case is made easier because the clinical instructor's comments have
nothing to do with the subject matter she was assigned to teach, even if the

106. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 3. As the 1970 Interpretive Comments make clear,
the idea is to discourage persistent irrelevant material, not academic controversy. Id. at 5.
107. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2006).
108. Id. at 669. Where the content of the curriculum is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns, the choice is usually upheld, absent an issue regarding whether the
concerns are pretextual. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2004).
109. Piggee, 464 F.3d at 669.
110. Id. at 671-72.
Ill. Id.at671.
112. Id.at671-72.
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topic "richly deserves full public discussion."' "1 3 The resolution is consistent
with several cases in which the First Amendment-let alone academic
her
freedom-has not been extended to allow an instructor to inject his11or
4
religious views into the classroom while instructing on secular subjects.
2. Teaching Methods
This outcome is also consistent with cases holding that, when teaching
methods conflict with those advocated by the university or its tenured faculty,
the university will prevail. 15 Although content-based regulation ordinarily is
not favored, when the university speaks-as it does through curriculum
choices and methods-it can regulate based upon content, meaning that it can
place restrictions on what may and may not be taught and still be in
compliance with the First Amendment. 1 6 Thus, the university is the speaker,
and the faculty member is the university's agent or proxy."17 It follows that
this concept extends to extra-curricular activities sponsored by the school." 8
Of course, some institutional restraint is probably present in this area, as
"[u]niversity officials are undoubtedly aware that quality faculty members will
be hard to attract and retain if they are to be shackled in much of what they
do."' 19
3. Assigning Grades and GradingPolicies
Closely related to teaching methods are evaluation methods, both in the form
of faculty members evaluating students and the university evaluating faculty
members' teaching abilities. A university may require a faculty member to

113. Id. at671.
114. See, e.g., Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 689, 700 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that bulletin board postings with religious overtones were curricular speech and, therefore, not
matters of public concern entitled to First Amendment protection); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of
Penn., 156 F.3d 488, 489, 491 (3d Cir. 1998); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (1 1th
Cir. 1991). Indeed, such proselytizing is beyond individual academic freedom, and it is not
surprising that the academic freedom of the institution prevails. See Rabban, Faculty Autonomy,
supra note 63, at 1410 ("Professors violate the norms of academic freedom when they falsify or
plagiarize material, indoctrinate students, follow blindly the dictates of political or religious
authority, or allow grants from government or industry to distort their research and
conclusions.").
115. Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425-26 (1 st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Hetrick
v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973).
116. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); see also Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (holding that the government may prohibit abortion-related advice
from being offered by those private actors it subsidizes to carry its message concerning family
planning).
117. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001).
118. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that
a coach had no free speech right to contravene the school board's policy prohibiting faculty
participation in student-led prayer activity).
119. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075.
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conform to its grading policy; the cases, however, vary in their discussion of
whether a university may require the faculty member to endorse a grade
On the one hand, in
change contrary to his or her professional judgment.'
Paratev. Isibor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that a grade is a symbolic communication from the faculty • member
to the
,,121
While the
student and "is entitled to some... First Amendment protection.
university may change a grade on a student's transcript (from a "B" to an "A"
in this case), it may not require the faculty member to publicly endorse the
changed grade. 122 On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has concluded that a faculty member lacks a First
Amendment right in grade assignment procedures; therefore, a faculty member
may be required to change an "F" to an "Incomplete" without compromising
academic freedom, which belongs to the institution insofar as grade
assignments are concerned. 123 Given that the institution generally has the right
to set grading policy, surely application of that policy by faculty members is
not inviolate.
In addition to claims over final grades, faculty members have claimed
individual academic freedom in grading procedures with little success. In
Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, a part-time lecturer sued various tenured faculty
members, claiming retaliation when she did not receive a teaching
assignment.' 24 The controversy arose when the plaintiff gave more than threequarters of her students a grade of "incomplete" for substandard work and only
very general directions--communicated through a listserv-on how that work
was to be improved and final grades were to be calculated. 125 Although her
superior required that she offer individual guidance to the students, the plaintiff
did not comply, apparently basing her refusal on pedagogical concerns.
The Sixth Circuit held that no First Amendment right or academic freedom
was implicated either by the superior's request that the lecturer communicate
further with the students or the university's failure to give the lecturer another
teaching assignment. 27 Accordingly,
[w]hile the First Amendment may protect Johnson-Kurek's right to
express her ideas about pedagogy, it does not require that the
university permit her to teach her classes in accordance with those
120. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
121. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989).
122. Id.at 824, 827-29.
123. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001). In the First Circuit, a tenured
professor's resistance to changing a grade following a student complaint led to his termination,
notwithstanding the professor's claim of a violation of academic freedom. Otero-Burgos v. Inter
Am. Univ., 558 F.3d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir. 2009).
124. Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 591 (6th Cir. 2005).
125. Id at 591-92.
126. Id.at 592, 595 n.l.
127. Id.at 594-95.
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ideas. The freedom of a university to decide what may be taught and
how it shall be taught would be meaningless if a professor were
entitled to refuse to comply with university requirements
whenever
28
they conflict with his or her teaching philosophy.
In sum, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that a university had the power
to override a faculty member's grade by directing that a change be made on the
transcript, but that
it could not compel a faculty member to publicly endorse
29
such a change.'
4. Whose Academic Freedom Is It, Anyway?
Academic freedom is often promoted as a personal right, but substantial
authority suggests that courts view it primarily as an institutional right. In fact,
some circuits have indicated that constitutional academic freedom is an
institutional right, not necessarily an individual right. 130 For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that a faculty
member may have a First Amendment right to speak on matters of public
concern outside the classroom, but also that faculty members do not have a
right to contravene the institution's policies concerning the four academic
freedoms identified by the Supreme Court.' 3' It is therefore not surprising that
the institution usually prevails when it comes to teaching and evaluation
methods.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
academic freedom is an institutional right in a challenge by state university
faculty members who objected to a law that restricted state employees from
accessing sexually explicit material on computers owned or leased by the
state. 132 The faculty members contended that such a restriction interfered with
their research and teaching activities.' 33 An en banc court concluded that the
state could regulate the manner in which state employees performed their
duties without implicating the First Amendment, because the complaint did not
involve state employees speaking as private citizens on matters of public
128. Id. at 595.
129. Id. at 594-95.
130. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 172 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1524 (2009); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
Asociaci6n de Educaci6n Privada de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st
Cir. 2007) (dictum); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that
the Supreme Court has recognized a right to institutional academic freedom and acknowledging a
split in authority as to individual academic freedom). But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 586 n.6 (1987) (suggesting, in a religious freedom case, that academic freedom allows
instructors to teach material consistent with their professional judgment).
131. Borden, 523 F.3d at 172 (citing Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001)
and Bradley v. Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990)).
132. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 416. Employees could seek permission from state agencies for
access in relation to approved research projects. Id.
133. Id. at 409 n.9.
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concern that involve the First Amendment. 34 Urged to reject the law as
interfering with the academic freedom of the faculty members, the Fourth
Circuit held that while academic freedom may be a professional norm, it is not
a personal constitutional right.135 Instead, faculty members, like all state
employees, enjoy protection from adverse employment action based on their
private First Amendment activities; any academic freedom relates only to the
36
autonomy of the institution.'
At the same time, declaring academic freedom an institutional right suggests
a monolithic institution possibly aligned against individual faculty members.
Yet shared governance and academic decisions often involve faculty input into
policies and decisions of the institution. After all, in theory, the faculty drive
academic decision-making, and an institutional view of academic freedom may
result in one group of faculty aligned against another. In other words, it is not
uncommon for faculty to disagree about academic matters, and the academic
freedom may reside with the faction in power->a result that may provide little
comfort for those in minority positions. On the other hand, where shared
governance is weak, an institutional view of academic freedom may empower
administrators to make decisions affecting academic matters without building a
consensus among the faculty.
D. Conclusion
Judicial recognition of academic freedom began with faculty qualifications
but now extends to curriculum, teaching methods, admissions, and retention.
Absent unusual circumstances, the state cannot condition faculty selection and
retention on ideology or loyalty; rather, the academic institution is charged
with creating and implementing a system of faculty qualifications. This notion
is consistent with the idea that academic freedom is more an institutional-as
opposed to an individual-right, particularly with respect to diversity policies,
curriculum design and delivery, and evaluation methods. In matters of
pedagogy, the university generally prevails over the individual faculty
member, and while a climate of academic freedom may prevail at most
universities, constitutional protection may be more limited when it comes to
employee speech. At least on matters of public concern, public employee
speech has long enjoyed qualified protection under the First Amendment, but
that qualified protection may be more limited following the decision in
Garcetti.
134. Id.at409.
135. Id. at 411; see also Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some
Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1545-46 (2007) (differentiating
between institutional autonomy for universities, which is accepted by the courts, and academic
freedom, which encompasses individual rights for faculty members).
136. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 415. Of course, the advantage of institutional academic freedom is
that it may protect the institution from external threats to its academic judgments. See Schauer,
supra note 54, at 920-24.
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11. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AFFORDED SPEECH MADE BY PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES

The government is rightly concerned with operational efficiency and
effectiveness in performing its tasks. Accordingly, and to those ends, the
government enjoys greater power to regulate the speech of its employees than
its citizens.' 37 This is true notwithstanding the fact that academic employment
Other constitutional guarantees found in the Fourth and
is involved.
Fourteenth Amendments are applied without reference to the field of
employment. The Supreme Court recently indicated that "class-of-one" equal
protection, which dispenses with the requirement that a plaintiff must be a
member of a protected class, simply does not apply in the public employee
context. 138 These restrictions are not unique to academic employees.
Traditionally, public employees have a right to speak out on matters of
public concern. 1 39 In determining whether the employee should prevail, preGarcetti courts relied on the Pickering/Connick test, which requires an
employee to prove that the speech involved a matter of public concern and that
Under the
it was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.
test, an employer prevails if it proves that its interest in an effective workforce
outweighs the free speech interests of the employee, or that the adverse
employment action would have been the same absent the protected speech. 14 1
Garcetti added a new element to this mix-namely, whether the speech was
job responsibilities or involved the employee
pursuant to the employee's
142
speaking out as a citizen.
Academic personnel may choose to speak out in a variety of contexts, such
as when teaching, conducting research, or performing service responsibilities.
However, where such speech goes beyond personal interest and into the realm
of social or political issues, it may be considered to be speech on a matter of
public concern. 143 But when it comes to discipline-related speech regarding
curriculum and teaching methods, an academic employer usually will prevail,
given its institutional academic freedom to set the curriculum and prescribe its
application, including the assessment of student performance.144 Disciplinerelated speech outside the classroom may be similarly unprotected where it
strongly contravenes institutional norms.145
137. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
138. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2155 (2008).
139. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987).
140. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1186 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Schrier v.
Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 1241,
1247 (10th Cir. 2001)).
141. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1186.
142. Gareetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
143. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
144. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001).
145. Pugel v. Bd. of Trs., 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004).
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The additional limitation imposed by Garcetti-that the speech not be
pursuant to job responsibilities-may not effectuate a large change in this area
because (1) the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether this
limitation should apply to scholarship or teaching,146 (2) the limitation may not
apply when the employee speaks or complains outside the chain of command,
and (3) the Pickering/Connick test provides only limited protection to
employee speech. 147 At the same time, a strong argument can be made for not
imposing this limitation when the speech involves scholarship or teaching
because it is contrary to the objective of critical inquiry that academic freedom
promotes. Even though some content-based regulation is an inevitable result
of academic judgments about promotion and tenure, content-based censorship
of scholarship or teaching, where the government restricts speech on nonacademic grounds because of disagreement with the message, is contrary to
principles of academic freedom. 148 This type of activity ought to receive a
hearing because it has the greatest potential to violate the First Amendment.
Admittedly, Garcetti does work some strange results.
Constitutional
protections may turn on the manner in which an employee brings to light a
matter of public concern.
Additionally, the implications for faculty
governance are troubling. Faculty members are expected to speak out
regarding the policy and operations of academic institutions, and while this
may not constitute speech on a matter of public concern, it certainly is for the
betterment of the academic institution.
A. Academic Personnelas Employees
Any discussion of the constitutional protection accorded public-universityemployee speech must begin with the proposition that the government has far
more power to regulate the activities of its employees than it does the
expression of its citizens. 149 The government functioning as an employer is
concerned with operational effectiveness and efficiency, and it may limit the
speech of its employees to achieve those ends.1 50 Content-based restrictions on
speech are problematic vis-d-vis the public but may be appropriate when the
sovereign acts as a public employer. 15 1 The First Amendment allows for
unpopular and even offensive speech, and political speech is at the core of
what is protected.152 However, in the context of a harmonious working and
146. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
147. Id.at421,423.
148. The authors readily acknowledge that professional academic freedom is limited by
"scholarly standards and professional ethics." Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 63, at
1408-09.
149. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2151 (2008) (quoting Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994)).
150. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675.
151. Id.at671.
152. Id. at 672.
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learning environment, few would suggest that academic personnel enjoy an
unqualified First Amendment right to engage in offensive speech that would
compromise relationships with colleagues or students, speech that would
undermine administrative direction, or speech that would advocate for a
particular political candidate.153 The right to speak out in the workplace is
qualified because it can impair the effective functioning of the unit; dissension
can impede policy and serve as a distraction.154 At the same time, caution is
necessary, so that "public employers do not use authority over employees to
silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions 55
but simply because
superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech."1
B. Limitations on Other ConstitutionalRights in an Academic Setting
The protection afforded academic personnel in other areas is similarly
limited as a result of the public employment context and its limitations on
constitutional rights. For example, citizens enjoy a Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 56 That right normally
includes a requirement that searches be founded upon probable cause and a
court-issued warrant; however, neither is required when an academic employer
performs a non-investigatory search of an employee's office or conducts an
investigation of work-related misconduct.1 57 Although academic personnel
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain areas of the workplace,
the reasonableness of a search is influenced by the needs of the employer to
maintain an effective workforce; such a search need only
be• justified
at its
••
158
inception and reasonably related in scope to that justification.
Thus, a
search to uncover suspected work-related
wrongdoing is acceptable given a
159
reasonable basis for suspicion.
In the due process area, at-will academic personnel do not possess a liberty
interest providing protection from discharge based upon an employer's

153. Id. at 672-74.
154. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987).
155. Id. at 384.
156. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
157. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (plurality opinion).
158. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) and Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
159. Id. at 726. Inquiries concerning a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace
are highly fact specific. While a university employee may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a purse or briefcase carried into a campus office, an office safe not identified and in an
open area may not qualify. The safest course for law enforcement is to secure a warrant, as was
done in United States v. Soderstrand.412 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2005). In Soderstrand,
the defendant, a department chair at a state university, unsuccessfully sought to suppress child
pornography discovered in an office safe stored in a department supply room. Id at 1151-52.
The court held that the clerical person who discovered the contraband was not functioning as a
state actor because she was acting for her own purpose, and the warrant that later issued was
either valid or the police executed the warrant in good faith reliance upon it. Id. at 1152.
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mistaken reasons, at least in situations in which those reasons have not been
made public.' 60 Thus, an at-will academic employee may be discharged for
reasons that are inadequate or even false, and no liberty interest is implicated
so long as the reasons have not been publicly disclosed.16 1 In assessing the
guarantee of equal protection, the Supreme Court recently held that the "classof-one" theory of equal protection-based on irrational government treatment
of one person, rather than class-based discrimination-is not available in the
public employee context. 162 To recognize such a theory would be inconsistent
with the discretion granted to supervisory personnel to make subjective,
individualized decisions. 163 Thus, faculty members at public universities will
not be able to utilize a "class-of-one" equal protection theory when challenging
adverse actions.
C. The Pickering/Connick Test: The Faculty'sRight to Speak Out Without
Getting Fired
When it comes to speaking out, the constitutional protection afforded to
university employees is already limited-the speech must involve a matter of
public concern and not impair the operational effectiveness and efficiency of
the program involved. 164 If the speech is on a matter of public concern, an adhoc balancing occurs between a public employee's right to speak out and the
government employer's interest in the operational effectiveness and efficiency
of its programs.
As such, even in the best case, speech implicating academic
freedom would be balanced against the university's interests.' 66 The Court has
developed a framework for analysis-the Pickering/Connick test-which
comes with a wealth of applications. 67 The general rule holds an employer
liable for retaliating against an employee who has engaged in protected speech;
the analysis, however, is more nuanced. 168 Key inquiries include whether the
speech at issue was on a matter of public concern and whether the faculty
member's interest in the speech is outweighed by the university's reasons for
69
limiting
suchthat
speech.
thea Pickering/Connick
test, a and
faculty
must prove
the speechUnder
was on
matter of public concern
that member
it was a

160. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
161. Id at 349.
162. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2148, 2153-55 (2008).
163. Id.at 2156.
164. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
165. Id.
166. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1307-10.
167. Garcetti v. Ceballos modified the PickeringConnick test by requiring a preliminary
inquiry of whether the speech is made pursuant to employment responsibilities; if so, the speech
is unprotected regardless of how the Pickering/Connick test might be resolved. Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424, 426 (2006).
168. Schrier v. Univ. ofColo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005).
169. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
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substantial or motivating factor in an adverse 0employment action, such as nonrenewal of the employee's teaching contract.17
The first inquiry-whether the speech in question is on a matter of public
concern-depends upon the "content, form, and context" of the speech in
reference to the entire record.
The Supreme Court has often found teachers'
comments to be protected in public education settings; specifically, such
protection has been afforded in situations in which (1) a teacher criticized both
a school board's allocation of funds between athletics and educational
programs and the lack of transparency in seeking additional revenue, 72 (2) a
teacher advocated in favor of the institution's shift from a two-year to a fouryear academic program,17 3 and (3) a teacher disclosed a school dress code to
the media in an effort to garner public support for a bond issue.1 74 A broad
conception of "public concern" might suggest that most of what public
universities do qualifies.1 75 But in deciding whether speech is on a matter of
public concern, the essential inquiry is whether the employee is speaking as an
employee on a matter of personal interest or as a member of the public on
matters of public concern, regardless of whether those matters are political or
social. 176 A faculty member's speech is on a matter of public concern if it
transcends personal interest or opinion
and implicates social or political issues
177
that are of concern to the community.
Under the Pickering/Connick test, a university may still prevail if it can
prove either that the adverse action would have occurred even in the absence of
the protected speech or that its interest in suppressing the speech outweighs the
employee's interest in making it. 17 The university may claim threatened or
actual disruption, including reduced employee morale and an impairment of
work functions, if the speech is allowed to continue. 79 When the state acts as
an employer and is, by necessity, concerned with the proper functioning of the
government, its predictions of harm that will result from employee speech are

170. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
171. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
172. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1967).
173. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595 (1972).
174. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
175. Matthew W. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic Freedom, and the FirstAmendment,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1346-47 (1988) [hereinafter Finkin, IntramuralSpeech].
176. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (describing a
matter of public concern as "an issue of social, political, or other interest to a community" (citing
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146)).
177. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1189 (6th Cir.
1995).
178. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
179. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675-77 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
degree to which the speech impairs the effective and efficient functioning of the government
employer is based on "the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be"); see also Umbehr,
518 U.S. at 676-77; Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
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given more weight than such predictions accompanying general restrictions on
public speech.1i s Many of the cases in this area deal with actual disruption
claimed by the university when the adverse action follows the speech in
question.18 '
That said, the university may impose "only those speech
' 182
restrictions that are necessary for [it] to operate efficiently and effectively."
From a faculty member's perspective, academic freedom may involve
teaching, researching, or commenting as a faculty member or as a citizen. As
noted, the university has the right to prescribe the curriculum and ensure that it
is being taught, although instructors certainly have the right to comment on the
subject matter.' 83 This means that a public university professor lacks a First
Amendment right to decide unilaterally what will be taught in the classroom,
particularly where it conflicts with the prescribed curriculum. 84 At the same
180. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676-77 (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673, 675).
181. See, e.g., Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (noting
that the action being challenged occurred after the speech in question).
182. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006); see also Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 299 (2007) (extending speech restrictions intended to
promote the effective and efficient operation of a business to public high school athletic leagues).
183. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2006).
184. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998). In the public
elementary and secondary context, disputes about teaching methods that implicate free speech are
plentiful. These cases must be viewed in light of the premise that elementary and secondary
schools have more control over curricular speech "to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are
not erroneously attributed to the school." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988). Thus, school officials may restrict the content of such speech, provided the restrictions
"are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id at 273. The rule broadly applies
to those school activities directed by faculty members and designed to impart knowledge. Id. at
271; Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994).
At times, the Hazelwood rule has been applied to curriculum matters in the university setting.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939,
949 (9th Cir. 2002).
One line of authority holds that the institution can insist on neutrality or fidelity to its
prescribed message. Thus, a social studies teacher commenting on the war in Iraq in response to
a question during current events may have been commenting on a matter of public concern, but
the school district could decline to renew her contract on this basis without offending the First
Amendment. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478-80 (7th Cir. 2007);
accord Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 689, 697 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
school could insist on removal of items of a religious nature posted on classroom bulletin board
when the items were curricular in nature, and that disputes about the curriculum are not matters of
public concern); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that a school board and superintendent could prohibit a teacher from teaching
creation science); Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
teacher could be discharged for not teaching patriotism as part of the established curriculum due
to her religious principles). This rationale is based on several considerations: (1)minor students
are a captive audience given compulsory education laws; (2) teachers are hired for the on-topic
speech they will provide; (3) changes concerning the curriculum ought to be entrusted to elected
school board members who can be voted out of office, rather than tenured teachers; and (4) if
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time, the curriculum is generally a product of the considered judgment of the
department or area faculty, and such curriculum choices ought to85be protected
in accordance with the notion of institutional academic freedom.'
What about discipline-related speech outside the classroom? Where the
speech is related or tangentially related to the discipline, but is strongly
contrary to institutional norms, the university usually prevails. Thus, in Pugel
v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, a graduate student employed
as a teaching assistant was dismissed for fabricating data submitted to a
publication and for presenting it at a conference.' 86 On a motion to dismiss,
the court assumed that, even if the speech was a matter of public concern, the
interest of the university outweighed the teaching assistant's interest in
speaking.187 At stake was the university's interest in the integrity of its
intellectual mission and research, which in turn implicated its reputation in the
academic and scientific communities.188 Not surprisingly, academic integrity
prevailed over the employee's interest in the presentation, given prior

teachers were given a First Amendment right over the choice of curriculum, judges would
displace school board members as arbiters of curriculum choice. Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479-80;
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Many of these cases were decided using the Pickering/Connick test. For example, an
employee who was not rehired on account of his use of a non-approved reading list and one who
was transferred due to the selection of a controversial play as part of the curriculum simply do not
speak on matters of public concern; these issues involved ordinary employment disputes of
private interest to the teachers, albeit disputes over the curriculum. Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 (holding
that bulletin board postings, while not a matter of public concern, involve a dispute over
curriculum); Boring, 136 F.3d at 370-71 (finding a play to be a matter of school curriculum and
not a matter of public concern); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th
Cir. 1989) (stating that a reading list which varies from the school-approved list is a matter of
curriculum and not a matter of public concern).
Another line of authority applies the Pickering/Connicktest but specifically rejects the notion
that a teacher's speech concerning curriculum cannot be a matter of public concern. EvansMarshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 231-32 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, in Cockrel v. Shelby
County School District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in reversing a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board, held that a fifth grade teacher's
discussion of the environmental benefits of industrial hemp was speech on a matter of public
concern that was not outweighed by the school district's interest in the efficient and harmonious
operation of the workplace. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052, 1055 (6th
Cir. 2001). Where school administrators or the school board have previously approved the
curriculum choices, if not the precise manner of the teacher's delivery, claims of disruption are
viewed as the government's own making. Id. at 1054-55.
185. Cf Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 63, at 1424-25 (explaining that even though
unorthodox and unpopular views may be protected by the notion of academic freedom, a
department is not required to hire faculty to represent all professionally acceptable views and
approaches).
186. Pugel v. Bd. of Trs., 378 F.3d 659, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 668.

188.

Id.
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proceedings that comported with due process had established that the data was

fabricated. 189
Another case offering stark contrasts involved the non-renewal of a nontenured assistant psychology professor's contract following a series of
incidents in which the professor made sexually charged comments that were
demeaning to women. 19° The assistant professor claimed that some of the
comments were protected under the First Amendment and, presumably,
academic freedom, because they occurred after hours at an academic
conference and were made in res p onse to a television broadcast on the mating
rituals of humans and primates. 19 Analyzing the context, form, and content of
the speech against the entire record, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit came to the conclusion that the speech was on a matter of
private concern, involving an attempt to solicit companionship and to irritate
others. 192 Abusive behavior toward faculty colleagues, staff, and students is
not entitled to First Amendment protection merely because it occurs in an
academic environment, whether inside or outside
the classroom. 193 Academic
1 94
freedom is not a cover for personal failings.
Some claims of academic freedom involve an employee's public comments
that may relate to the mission of the university or department but differ as to
what is expected from the university administration.195 Cases prior to Garcetti
had reached divergent results and often
involved due process claims 196 in
97
1
claims.
Amendment
First
addition to
In Hulen v. Yates, faculty members in the accounting and taxation
department at Colorado State University sought to revoke a colleague's tenure
189. Id. at 668-69. This result is completely consistent with traditional academic freedom
that is predicated on personal responsibility for ethical behavior. See VAN ALSTYNE, Specific
Theory of Academic Freedom, supra note 8, at 71 ("The maintenance of academic freedom
contemplates an accountability in respect to academic investigations and utterances solely in
respect of their professional integrity, a matter usually determined by reference to professional
ethical standards of truthful disclosure and reasonable care.").
190. Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 881-83 (7th Cir. 2003).
191. Id. at 881,884.
192. Id. at 887.
193. Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 824 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that an educational
institution has a strong interest in preventing harassing speech that creates a hostile learning
environment); Mills v. W. Wash. Univ., 208 P.3d 13,21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
194. Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 63, at 1410 (noting that academic freedom does
not shelter incompetence, lack of productivity, or neglect of duties).
195. Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 6, at 294 ("The status of intramural speech by
professors has enormous practical significance, for disputes over university policies and
personalities have far outnumbered classic academic freedom cases involving the content of
teaching or scholarship.").
196. Due process claims generally require a property interest in continued employment. See
infra notes 306-26 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (noting that a First
Amendment claim is not dependent upon having a property interest in continued employment).
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based on a variety of charges ranging from plagiarism to misuse of state
funds.' 98 The faculty members were warned that adverse actions could occur if
the matter was not dropped. 199 Four faculty members were subsequently
transferred to different departments within the College of Business. 0 0
Although he taught tax, the plaintiff was transferred from the accounting
department to the management department and was restricted to teaching only
two tax classes per year. 20 1 He sued, claiming that he had been deprived of a
property interest-his appointment to the accounting department-without due
process and that university officials had retaliated against him for his protected
speech in violation of the First Amendment. 20 Although the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff-professor had a
property interest in his departmental assignment, it held that his repeated
entreaties to the university administration provided him with all of the process
that he was due concerning the transfer. 2 03 But the court also held that his
comments concerning the situation in the accounting department constituted
speech on a matter of public concern that was not outweighed
by the
20 4
university's stated reason of maintaining departmental harmony.
Hulen is consistent with several cases that have found public comments
about the expenditure of public funds at a public university-as well as
comments about the objectives, purposes, and mission of the university-to
constitute matters of public concern. 20 5 For example, speaking out about
faculty salaries could be categorized as a matter of public concern. 20 6 At the
same time, not every employment decision or complaint concerning faculty or
university governance, application of the faculty handbook, or resource

198. Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1233 n. . Then-Department Chair Michael Moore resigned and subsequently left
the university. Id. at 1233.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1234.
203. Id. at 1243-44, 1248-49 (concluding that Dr. Hulen received all of the pre- and posttransfer processes to which he was entitled). The university had never made an involuntary
transfer such as this one. Id. at 1243. The general rule is that a faculty member lacks a property
interest in a departmental assignment and will not have a procedural due process claim if he is
transferred with the same rank and pay. See Huang v. Bd. of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1142
(4th Cir. 1990); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (11 th Cir. 1988); Kelleher v. Flawn,
761 F.2d 1079, 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that graduate students lack a property interest in
specific teaching duties).
204. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1238-39.
205. See, e.g., Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005) (concerning
the expenditure of public funds and the impact on patient care in relation to proposed move of
medical school); Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 729-30 (11 th Cir. 1988) (relating to a concern
that public funds were not being used for educational purposes).
206. Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 819-20 (7th Cir. 2000).
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allocation is a matter of public concern. 2 7 As the Tenth Circuit observed in
the context of a dispute concerning the membership of a university
administrative committee, "[a]lthough many an academic donnybrook has been
fought over such administrative rules, the issues at stake rarely transcend the
internal workings of the university to affect the political or social life of the
,208
community."
Academic institutions simply could not function if every
decision concerning these matters metamorphosed into a constitutional
issue. 2 09 At the same time, such comments might be protected pursuant to
210
professional academic freedom.
While there is a well-established body of law applying the First Amendment
to faculty comments on matters of public concern, the matter is made more
complicated to the extent that those comments are attributable to employment
responsibilities, specifically participation in faculty governance. An equally
difficult question is whether the scholarly viewpoints of university faculty
members-whether published or declared in the classroom-are protected
speech given that such viewpoints are the product of employment
responsibilities. 211 To analyze these problems, we must consider Garcetti.
D. Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Newest Limitation on Employee Speech
Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who complained of retaliatory
employment actions after he spoke out about misrepresentations contained in
an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 212 The speech was contained in a
memorandum that was prepared as part of the deputy's job.213 It was thus
considered to be "commissioned or created" by the employer, because it was
drafted as part of the deputy's professional responsibilities; therefore, the
207. Bunger v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 95 F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus,
remarks before a faculty senate criticizing members of a public board of regents and the
administration and seeking a vote of no-confidence based on non-compliance with an internal
policy on appointments did not involve matters of public concern; rather, they involved disputes
concerning internal governance. Clinger v. Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 (10th Cir.
2000). On the other hand, seeking a vote of no-confidence by the faculty association based on the
college president's alleged misrepresentation of credentials, declining enrollment, and subjective
reduction-in-force procedures did involve matters of public concern. Gardetto v. Mason, 100
F.3d 803, 812-14 (10th Cir. 1996). Obviously, the cases are fact specific, but where the speaker
makes comments pursuant to self-interest, it will be easier to find that the speech is an internal
grievance, rather than speech on a matter of public concern. In contrast, where a group of faculty
members speaks out concerning the overall well-being of the university, these facts suggest a
matter of public concern.
208. Bunger, 95 F.3d at 992.
209. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
210. Finkin, "Institutional"Academic Freedom, supra note 14, at 852 (remarking that under
traditional view of academic freedom, a faculty member is free to comment on and criticize
institutional policy, subject to standards for proper internal discourse).
211. See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).
212. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413-15 (2006).
213. Id. at 421.
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214
speech could not be citizen speech entitled to a First Amendment analysis.
Garcetti was a watershed case because it mandated that the first inquiry in
most public employee speech cases is whether the speech is part of the
employee's job responsibilities; if not, courts need not reach the question of
whether the speech is on a matter of public concern, nor must they conduct an
ad-hoc balancing between the interests of the employee and the public
employer. 215 At least two circuits have supported this conclusion. 216 At the
same time, language in Garcetti suggests that the Court left open the question
of whether the limitation should apply in cases involving scholarship and
teaching:
There is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's
customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for
that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.217
Although the Court did not limit application of its comment to post-secondary
education, it was responding to Justice Souter's concern that the new rule not
"imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges
and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to...
official duties.' 218 This suggests that the Court was concerned with academic
freedom at public
post-secondary-as opposed to elementary and secondary219
institutions.
Before discussing the exception to the rule, it should be noted that Garcetti
took a categorical view of speech made pursuant to employment
responsibilities, and no matter how much the speech informs public debate
about issues of public concern, it is unprotected. 220 The rationale was based on
concerns of federalism and separation of powers: federal courts should
minimize intrusion into local affairs and should not undertake to manage other

214. Id. at421-22.
215. Seeid.at423.
216. Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 652-54 (7th Cir. 2008); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin
Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007).
217. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. Compare Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474
F.3d 477, 478-79 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Garcetti to uphold the dismissal of a First
Amendment claim brought by a public school teacher regarding a statement made in a current
events class), with Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n. II (4th Cir. 2007)
(declining to apply Garcetti to a case involving speech related to teaching).
218. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 n.6 (1987) (suggesting that academic freedom
is not applicable to elementary and secondary education where the curriculum is proscribed by a
central authority).
220. See Garcetti,547 U.S. at 422-26 (majority opinion).
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governmental units. 22 1 Garcetti also was grounded on the idea that the
governmental employer may control what it has created-in this case,
speech. 222 Garcetti limited the prior qualified privilege, apparently rejecting
the notion that public employees may also function as citizens even though (1)
the topic pertains to employment responsibilities and (2) most public
employees
are rarely commissioned to carry a specific governmental
223
message.
Turning to the academic exception, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit concluded that if it applies at all, the exception only has
relevance to post-secondary education: an elementary school teacher who
spoke on a political issue as part of her official duties could not invoke
academic freedom to bypass this rule. 224 On the other hand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided not to apply the exception in a
case involving a high school teacher who posted religious material on a
bulletin board; instead, the court analyzed the matter under the
PickeringConnicktest and concluded that the speech was not on a matter
of
225
public concern and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment.
Many cases arising out of the public post-secondary academic setting
involve complaints of adverse employment action based on administrative
matters, as opposed to curriculum and scholarship; it is difficult, then, to see
why the Garcettilimitation would not apply. An argument could be made that
because all administrative pursuits are related to scholarship and teaching, all
academic speech should be exempt from Garcetti's reach; however, that
assertion seems overbroad. In this regard, equity has always been a concern:
why should faculty members-as public employees complaining about internal
and administrative matters-enjoy greater constitutional protection than other
public employees? 226 For example, suppose a faculty member complains about
how a grant is administered or how a teaching duty is assigned. While these
complaints may have an indirect effect on the academic mission, it is difficult
to argue that such complaints are qualitatively different merely because they
occur at an academic institution. In addition, analysis of government employee
speech under the Pickering/Connicktest has always been more nuanced, taking
particular care to evaluate the nature of the statements and their effect upon the
227
institution.

221. Id. at 423.
222. Id. at 421-22.
223. Id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 436-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
225. Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 689, 694, 695 n.1 1(4th Cir. 2007).
226. See, e.g., Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the First Amendment would be applied unequally if professors had "a special constitutional right
of academic freedom"); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 415 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding
that the fight of academic freedom does not extend beyond protection from dismissal).
227. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 150 (1983).
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The statements' effect on the institution may be realized more directly in
situations in which faculty members are participating in the governance of the
institution, college, or department. 2 28 Faculty members are expected to
participate in such activities, often as part of a service requirement. Such
participation may involve serving on committees to (1) evaluate faculty for
hiring and promotion, (2) supply programmatic recommendations, and (3)
provide
recommendations
concerning
resource
allocation
and
administration.229 Although administrators are tasked with the duty of
implementing policies, the faculty's professional expertise is essential to assess
faculty qualifications and to make recommendations and decisions of a
programmatic dimension.
Three recent cases suggest that courts are capable of determining what
faculty members do. 2 30 Even though faculty members have discretion, job
descriptions do exist and annual performance reviews are commonplace,
thereby suggesting that faculty functions are specifically defined. In Renken v.
Gregory, a professor who obtained a National Science Foundation grant
claimed that he had been retaliated against when he took issue with the
university's proposed allocation of the grant funds. 231 Acknowledging that
university professors have teaching, research, and service responsibilities, the
Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti and held that administering the grant was a
part of those responsibilities. 232 One of the purposes of the grant was to
improve undergraduate education, and as the "principal investigator/project
director who signed and submitted the grant proposal," the professor was to
receive course buyouts, which equated to a reduction in teaching load.233
Although the professor argued that he had discretion vis-at-vis applying for and
administering the grant, the Seventh Circuit recognized that securing and
administering grant funds was done in fulfillment of his teaching and research
responsibilities, as well as the requirements underpinning his promotion to full

228. Although many structures exist, the foundation for faculty governance and cohesion is
probably the academic department, with some department faculty participating in college
governance and fewer faculty participating in some university-wide governing body, such as a
faculty senate.

See Mary Burgan, WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE FACULTY?

DRIFT AND

DECISION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 188 (2006); see also O'Neil, supra note 4, at 193 (suggesting
that a university-wide forum is usually necessary to maintain academic freedom). The academic
department generally has the most participation as the discipline-based unit and also would play a
key role in monitoring "on topic" content.
229. Neil W. Hamilton, Faculty Involvement in System-wide Governance, in COMPETING
CONCEPTIONS OF ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 77, 96-97 (William G. Tierney ed., 2004).
230. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 2009); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769,
774-75 (7th Cir. 2008); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168-69 (C.D. Cal. 2007), appeal
docketed, No. 07-56705 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2007).
231. Renken, 541 F.3d at 773.
232. Id. at 773-74.
233. Id.
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professor. 234 The court adopted this broad but practical view of what
university faculty do, suggesting that faculty members' discretion over their
research and service responsibilities does not preclude a holding that speech on
those subjects is made pursuant to employment responsibilities.
Likewise in Gorum v. Sessoms, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recognized that faculty often engage in service activities pursuant
to their job responsibilities. 236 In Gorum, a tenured professor and department
chair claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing the candidacy
of the university president, for advising a student during a disciplinary
proceeding, and for rescinding an invitation for the president to speak at a
prayer breakfast. 237 The university maintained that the professor was
terminated for changing the grades
of forty-eight students without the
238
professor-of-record's permission.
The Third Circuit concluded that the professor was speaking "within his
official duties" 239 and found that he could advise the student because he was a
faculty member and familiar with the disciplinary procedures through his
university committee work. The court noted that the description of facult2 4°
responsibilities included assisting and advising student organizations.
Without going as far as the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit applied the
Garcetti limitation because it viewed the professor's activities as clearly not
within the realm of either teaching or scholarship; therefore, the application of
that limitation did not imperil academic freedom. 24 1 The court agreed with the
district court's reasoning that the speech was not on a matter of public concern
nor a substantial factor in the termination; the court further agreed that the
decision to terminate would have been the same even in the absence of the
speech.242

Governance activities also would seem to fall within a faculty member's job
responsibilities. 243

In Hong v. Grant, the university denied a merit-based

salary increase to a tenured chemical engineering professor on account of his
insufficient research activities. 244 The professor had deferred the merit

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.at 774.

Id.

Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id.at 182-84.
Id.at 182.
Id.at 186.
Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.at 187-88.
243. See Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984) (noting that
although there may be a professional obligation to participate, "there is no constitutional right to

participate in academic governance").
244. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 0756705 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2007).
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increase determination for a year based on his insufficient research
productivity, yet when he was denied the merit increase the following year for
the same reason that he had previously acknowledged, he sued claiming that
245
the real reason for the denial was his protected speech.
The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the university defendants, holding that the
professor's critical comments were all made pursuant to his employment
responsibilities. 246 The court carefully considered the various statements at
issue: the professor had dissented from retention and promotion decisions,
complained that the faculty hiring process had been circumvented, and
condemned the ratio of full-time faculty members to lecturers. 247 The court
viewed these statements in light of the professor's professional and job
responsibilities and held that faculty members have a responsibility for shared
governance and participation in departmental affairs, including setting the
248
curriculum and making staffing, hiring, and promotion decisions.
Given
these responsibilities, the professor's statements were unprotected under
Garcetti.2? 9 In the alternative, the court held that the statements were not
matters of public concern because they involved only internal personnel
disputes. 25 The court did not consider whether Professor Hong's speech
might fall within the Garcetti exception for speech related to scholarship or
teaching. Regardless, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit could well affirm this case without reaching the issue of whether
Garcetti applies if it agrees with the district court's alternative
holding that the
251

statements did not involve matters of public concern.

245. Id.
246. Id.at 1169-70.
247. Id. at 1167-68.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1168.
250. Id. at 1169-70. Professor Hong's complaints concerning his colleagues centered on the
accuracy of hiring and promotion credentials and questioned whether a listed grant was
competitive, whether a colleague had actually supervised doctoral students, and whether
academic papers at conferences were actually refereed. Id. at 1162-63.
251. Recently, a subcommittee of the American Association of University Professors
expressed disappointment in the "early post-Garcetti cases" as insufficiently attentive as to how
Garcetti applies in the academic environment, attributing the lack of attention in part to the
academic community not pressing the issue. Robert M. O'Neil et al., Protectingan Independent
Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom After Garcetti v. Ceballos, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 67,
81-84, 88, available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/B3991F98-98D5-4CCO-9102-ED26
A7AA2892/0/Garcetti.pdf [hereinafter AAUP Subcommittee Report]. The subcommittee was
tasked with "surveying the landscape of legal and professional protections for academic freedom
at public colleges and universities in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti
v. Ceballos and to propose institutional policy language aimed at protecting academic freedom
where courts cannot or should not be relied upon." Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). The
subcommittee report noted that proper development of the relationship between Garcetti and
academic freedom necessarily includes alerting a court as to how a faculty member's speech may
come within Garcetti's possible exception for scholarship and teaching, or faculty governance
which arguably might receive protection. Id. at 81. For example, in Hong v. Grant, Professor
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To be sure, faculty members have the discipline-based knowledge to make
intelligent decisions about a potential or current colleague's contribution to the

Hong's condemnation of the ratio of full-time faculty members to lecturers might be related to
"scholarship" in the sense that over-reliance on lecturers might diminish the department's
teaching and scholarship. Id.
Of core concern, the subcommittee report suggests that the early cases (as well as Garcetti)
reflect a lack of appreciation of faculty governance and the professional nature of the faculty,
both of which are quite different than the "master-servant framework" that animates Garcetti. ld.
at 82, 88. According to the report, the Supreme Court's public employee speech casesPickering, Connick, and Garcetti-arebased on the need for managerial control of subordinates
so as to avoid "disharmony, disruption, and ... insubordination." Id. at 82. It is this need for
control that places the speech outside of normally protected speech. Id. The report challenges the
validity of this assumption insofar as "faculty speech in or concerning institutional government."
Id. "Institutional rules or policies providing for faculty participation do not delegate authority to
subordinates in a hierarchy; they recognize the faculty as a body of cognate authority whose
individual and collective counsel should be sought, even whose approval must be secured in some
matters before institutional policies may be adopted or actions taken." Id Thus, the report
emphasizes that the "faculty cannot be considered to be a subordinate body in a managerial
hierarchy even as it exercises effective authority ....
[A] manager may be dismissed for publicly
criticizing her superior; a faculty member may not be dismissed for publicly criticizing her dean."
Id.
Differentiating faculty from other public employees based upon independent professional
judgment (even if required for institutional governance) may be a daunting task. See id. First,
Justice Stephen Breyer made a similar argument when he suggested that professionals who
engage in constitutionally required speech (and are subject to independent regulation) should not
be subject to the Garcetti rule. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although some
faculty might be subject to independent professional regulation-for example lawyers, medical
doctors, and accountants-there is no constitutional right to participate in academic governance.
Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287-88 (1984).
Second, an approach based on professional obligations seems inconsistent with Garcetti,
which is based not only on a need for managerial control, but also federalism and separation of
powers concerns, and a stated purpose to achieve parity between public and private employees.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23. The report suggests by way of analogy that the Supreme Court has
held that public defenders are not considered state actors given their relationship to their clients,
and that for purposes of collective bargaining, faculty have been deemed to be (albeit incorrectly)
managers rather than employees. AAUP Subcommittee Report, supra, at 82 (citing Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981) and NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980)).
Both cases do take a functional approach to job responsibilities. Thus, in Polk County, the public
defender was professionally required to exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client to
effectuate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel and therefore did not act
under color of state law. 454 U.S. at 320-22. However, the Court recognized that a public
defender acting in an administrative or investigative role may well be acting under color of state
law. Id. at 324-25. Analytically, defending a criminal case is a narrower function than
participating in faculty governance regarding "all major campus issues."
See AAUP
Subcommittee Report, supra, at 82.
While faculty may be unique insofar as some aspects of institutional governance, there is no
denying that faculty members are employees and that some management is necessary to achieve
institutional goals. Perhaps the degree of protection should logically depend upon how closely
related the faculty speech is to those areas where the faculty has governance responsibility. Yet
even in those governance matters where faculty judgment is essential, the outcome under Garcetti
seems apparent, creating some strange results. See infra notes 288-95 and accompanying text.
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field and certainly can provide valuable input concerning programs and
resource allocation. Application of Garcetti portends less protection for
faculty on this score; even if the speech discusses a matter of public concern, it
will not be protected to the extent it is part of job responsibilities. 252 This
result discourages faculty participation and is undesirable. The argument here
is not that every comment made by a faculty member in the name of faculty
governance should be protected speech; rather, those comments on matters of
public concern that involve faculty governance ought to be entitled to
the fact that a faculty member has a responsibility
protection, notwithstanding
253

to voice them.
A university is not unique in employing professionals who engage in peer

and programmatic review within professional constraints. For example, new

entrants to a profession, such as lawyers and accountants, are continually
evaluated, and peer review is commonplace for researchers. Likewise,
government agencies employ professionals, including those engaged in
research, and they must evaluate them. 254 From a policy perspective, such

252. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. One can envision speech formulating policy or speech
While
commenting on those policies that would come within the Garcetti limitation.
intellectually the university might have an interest in protecting the integrity of the process by
which it formulates policy, a lack of protection for either category is at odds with the open
communication needed for trust and effective faculty governance.
253. Professor Judith Areen suggests that while the Pickering/Connick test may be
appropriate when the government acts as a sovereign, when the government acts as an educator,
the speech of faculty members ought to be protected provided the speech involved "academic
matters"--namely, teaching, research, or faculty governance matters. Judith Areen, Government
as Educator: A New Understandingof First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and
Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 994 (2009). Under the framework proposed, the faculty member
would have the burden of proving that the speech concerned academic matters and that the speech
was responsible for the adverse action; thereafter, the university would have the burden of
proving that the action was based on faculty-approved policy or that the action was made on
academic grounds and was therefore not retaliatory. Id. at 994-96, 998. Thus, the new standard
would not address whether the speech was on a matter of public concern, whether it was made
pursuant to employment responsibilities, or whether the speech should prevail given an ad-hoc
balancing between the interests of the institution and those of the speaker. Id. at 994, 996.
Instead, the adverse action would stand to the extent that it was supported by the faculty or a
faculty committee, because a court would presume that the decision was made on academic
grounds, unless the plaintiff could establish that the decision was such a departure from academic
grounds that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. Id. at 995. Professor Areen
argues that the test would recognize the importance of higher education and remove the
presumption that, ordinarily, the institution prevails. Id. at 998-99.
The test would depart only slightly from the current outcomes concerning deference to
academic judgment; however, it might expand the involvement of the courts in university affairs.
In some sense, every decision made at a university, particularly those pertaining to resource
allocation, involves "academic matters." Id. at 994. Moreover, even assuming that speech is
protected, removing the ad-hoc balancing in the current test suggests an absolute approach to
speech--one that the Court has been hesitant to endorse, particularly given its recognition that
public employers, including universities, must be able to manage the institution.
254. Id. at 960-61.
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reviews ought to be made in an objective and fair manner that is free of
retaliation, but it is quite another step to conclude that speech in the aid of such
review functions is constitutionally protected because it arises in a university
setting. 255 In Garcetti,the calendar deputy was a lawyer, and his memorandum
was evaluated and disapproved of by other lawyers in the district attorney's
office-where the exercise of utmost discretion is expected.256 That Garcetti
should not apply to speech required by professional, discipline-related, or even
constitutional standards was Justice Stephen Breyer's position in his dissent.257
At some point, however, when the discourse moves from the micro- to the
macro-level, the Gareetti limitation could result in less protection for faculty
members than for other public employees. For example, where the faculty
utilizes established faculty governance procedures and takes the extraordinary
step of voting no-confidence in those governing an institution based on
spending priorities, those faculty members-no matter how they vote-ought
to be protected against retaliation, notwithstanding the fact that the faculty is
invited to participate in such activities and assuming that the matter is one of
public concern. Either the comments are only generally related to job
responsibilities, or the matter is one in which faculty members' comments are
made in their role as public citizens. After all, public universities tend to be
large employers that are responsible for research and teaching, and the
faculty's comments are in the nature of the give and take debate over
community issues.
Viewed in other contexts, Garcetti does not alter the well-established
principle that a university can set the curriculum; therefore, it imposes no
additional barrier to relief in the "stay on topic" cases. Thus, in Piggee v. Carl
Sandburg College, the court remarked that Garcetti was "not directly
relevant," and resolved the First Amendment issues on the principle that a
university can require a faculty member to teach the curriculum and avoid
extraneous subjects. 258 The Seventh Circuit later explained that its remark
did not reflect doubt about the rule that employers are entitled to
control speech from an instructor to a student on college grounds
during working hours; it reflected, rather, the fact that Piggee had not
been hired to buttonhole cosmetology students in the corridors
and
2 59
hand out tracts proclaiming that homosexuality is a mortal sin.

255. The Supreme Court was unwilling to shield tenure review materials from discovery in
an employment discrimination case even in light of an argument that such disclosure would
inhibit frank recommendations and contravened academic freedom. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182, 193, 197-98 (1990).
256. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413, 422-23 (noting that supervisors may evaluate an employee's
performance).
257. Id. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006).
259. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
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When it comes to pure content-based regulation of scholarship and teaching
in a university environment, application of Garcetti is also problematic.
Research and publication are undeniably within job responsibilities in the
broadest sense. While faculty members ordinarily must conduct research and
publish scholarly works, the university often does not insist on copyright, and
it is doubtful that the university would want to take ownership of the subject
matter, methodology, or conclusions of the research.260 Research and
publication further a core function of the university: knowledge creation.
Teaching involves another core function: knowledge dissemination. These
261
functions suggest that academic professionals are treated differently.
Accordingly, the Garcetti limitation should not apply where the adverse action
is claimed to be a product of impermissible content-based or viewpoint-based
discrimination.262
Consider two examples, one in the teaching context, and the other in the
research and publication context. In an accounting theory class, such an
arbitrary restriction might take the form of a directive that permits the
professor to address the reasons in favor of fair value accounting and disallows
263
discussion of the reasons opposing the use of fair value accounting.
Likewise, a policy prohibiting research that questions the internationalization
of accounting standards surely offends academic freedom and the First
Amendment. After all, the transcendent values of academic freedom are
diversity of thought and advancement of knowledge, and censorship imperils
those values. 264 These examples suggest that the government is regulating
based not26on
academic concerns, but purely based on its disagreement with the
5
message.
In its capacity as regulator, the government may regulate speech with
content-neutral regulation. 266 If the purpose of such regulation is justified
without reference to the content of the speech, it will be upheld even though it

260. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, "Your" Intellectual Property: Who Owns It?, 22
ACCT. HoRizoNs 49, 51 (2008).
261. Cf Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 6, at 255 (noting a functional approach to
immunity that may result in some professions receiving greater First Amendment rights).
262. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 (1990). In this regard, peer review by
administrators and a governing board may go a long way to ensure that such decisions are the
product of academic and professional concerns. See Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 63,
at 1410-12.
263. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (distinguishing
between content regulation, which may be permissible in keeping with the purpose of a limited
forum, and viewpoint discrimination "presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations"); Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 676 (8th Cir. 1997).
264. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
265. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
266. Id. (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
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may have an incidental effect upon such speech.
In the academic context, a
university may go further; some content-based regulation is inevitable because
268
the university is an academic enterprise concerned with academic merit.
Thus, a department could specialize in a particular discipline and favor
applicants who pursue research and publication in that area. Still, contentbased regulation of a faculty member's creative work has the greatest potential
for tension with academic freedom and the First Amendment, and such
regulation, though at times permissible, ought to allow a hearing 269
on the merits
even if it occurs as part of a faculty member's job responsibilities.
To be sure, the government has greater rights when it "acts as employer
rather than regulator." 270 A university certainly has the right to establish the
curriculum, set the grading procedure, and insist that faculty members stay on
topic. It may evaluate the research and performance of its faculty, but it must
do so based on legitimate and professional reasons. This conforms to wellestablished institutional norms of academic freedom: "teachers are entitled to
full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the

267. Id.
268. See Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 14, at 3 10 (arguing that the political norm of
not penalizing citizens on account of the content of their speech should not apply to an academic
enterprise like a university where many decisions are based upon content or, rather, intellectual
merit); Chen, supra note 66, at 966-67; Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown:
IntellectualDiversity Mandates and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 321, 349,
360-61 (2008) (noting that while Garcetti did not address how much control a university has over
speech, institutional academic freedom and the employee speech doctrine give a university "a
great deal of power over the content of the education it provides). In response to content
regulation inherent in the university environment, Professor Chen suggests a balancing test to
resolve individual academic freedom claims. Chen, supra note 66, at 975. Under the test, a
faculty member claiming First Amendment protection of his right to speak would demonstrate
some adverse action on account of speech; then, the burden would shift to the university to
demonstrate either that the speech is not germane to a specific and articulated part of the
university's mission or that the university's interest in suppressing the speech is "substantially
related to the advancement of a specific component of its articulated academic mission." Id. at
976-78, 982-83. The specificity required of the individual claimant and the university would
narrow the analysis. Id.at 983.
269. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990) (stating that the government
bears a heavy burden in attempting to justify content-based regulation); Emergency Coal. to
Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Any
substantive governmental restriction on [the instructor's] academic lectures would obviously
violate the First Amendment. Assuming that the right to academic freedom exists and that it can
be asserted by an individual professor, its contours in this case are certainly similar to those of the
right of free speech."); Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 680 n.19 (8th Cir. 1997) (disapproving of
content-based censorship of professor's protected speech because such censorship violated the
principle of academic freedom and the First Amendment); Harry F. Tepker, Jr. & Joseph Harroz,
Jr., On Balancing Scales, Kaleidoscopes, and the BlurredLimits ofAcademic Freedom, 50 OKLA.
L. REV. 1,34-40, 43-43 (1997) (suggesting that in applying the Pickering/Connicktest, courts
should begin with the consideration "that viewpoint discrimination is a sin worse than other forms
of government action").
270. Engquist v. Or. Dep't ofAgric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008).
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adequate performance of their other academic duties," and "[t]eachers are
entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject., 271 This is
such an important value that the limitations of Garcetti should not apply,
2 72
because the core functions of the university are research and teaching.
Academic freedom furthers the mission of the university; faculty become
experts in a discipline through research and analysis, and they teach students to
think critically. 273 Professional competence is determined by faculty peer
review, and shared governance often is the means of implementing that
review. 274 All of these functions have the potential to create controversy and
offend powerful internal and external constituencies; however, they are
275
essential to the credibility of universities and academic disciplines.
Of course, this discussion presupposes that a particular controversy is one
that can be characterized as a matter of public concern. Regardless of how
devoted the faculty member is to the field, it is difficult to argue that every
advance, discovery, or evaluation is a matter of public concern of interest to
the community. 27 6 Likewise, it is difficult to argue that every statement is
protected by academic freedom. 2 77 At the same time, facts matter, and capable
counsel ought to be able to marshal facts demonstrating why the matter is one
of public concern-perhaps by explaining that the faculty member's activities
involve resource allocation, the mission of the university, or the like. If the
controversy is one of public concern, a careful balancing of the employer's and
employee's interests ought to occur, and due regard should be given for both
parties' professional interests in academic freedom. 278
271.

1940 STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 3.

272. Hamilton, supra note 229, at 95 ("The mission of higher education is to create and
disseminate knowledge."); Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-GarcettiBlues, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 68 (2008) (taking a normative approach and suggesting that
application of Garcettito teaching and scholarship is inconsistent with "the democracy-promoting
purposes of higher education").
273. Hamilton, supra note 229, at 95-96; see also Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 14, at
265 (noting that academic freedom furthers a university's mission and demonstrates "the
university's commitment to the pursuit of truth and the controvertibility of dogma").
274. Hamilton, supra note 229, at 95-96.
275. Burgan, supra note 228, at 171; see also Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 883, 884, 900 (2006) (arguing that academic freedom requires that faculty
function as academics and advocate based on arguments and evidence, rather than political
preferences, to ensure that the rationale for academic freedom does not disappear).
276. R. George Wright, The Emergence of FirstAmendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L.
REV. 793, 820-21 (2007) (suggesting that the primary problem with the Pickering/Connicktest is
that much of what academic freedom seeks to protect does not necessarily involve matters of
public concern).
277. The PickeringConnick test and the Garcetti limitations are court-created analytical
tools designed to narrow the category of protected speech by public employees; the argument that
all speech is protected by academic freedom is at odds with what that doctrine was intended to
protect, and perhaps the most ingenuous argument is in favor of a more expansive First
Amendment doctrine for all employees. See Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 6, at 295.
278. Tepker & Harroz, supra note 269, at 39-40, 42-43.
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E. Applying Garcetti to Public University Faculty
Even if Garcettiapplies to public university faculty, the rule might not be as
limiting as initially thought. In Garcetti, the parties agreed that the speech in
question was written by the employee in accordance with his job
responsibilities.279 No "comprehensive framework" was developed for
determining when an employee acts within his or her job responsibilities; the
Court acknowledged that the speech concerned the employee's work and was
280
made at work but noted that such facts were not dispositive.
The Court
rejected Justice Souter's criticism that employers will merely broaden job
descriptions to cover all employee speech and emphasized that an employee's
job description is not determinative. 281 The Court explained that a practical
inquiry into what the employee is expected to do determines whether the
speech is within an employee's job responsibilities. 282 To avoid the Garcetti
limitation, a faculty member must demonstrate that he or she was speaking as a
citizen, rather than pursuant to his or her job responsibilities. 283 Courts have
identified two factors suggestive of this proposition: (1) the employee's
primary job responsibilities did not relate to alerting authorities to
wrongdoing2 84 and (2) the employee went outside the chain of command in
reporting the wrongdoing. 285 These factors tend to suggest that an employee is
exercising a right of freedom of expression that is granted to every citizen.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of cases hold that employees have
spoken pursuant to job responsibilities; in the real world of trial and uncertain
proof, a contrary showing may be difficult, if not counterintuitive. 286 The

279. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
280. Id. at 423-24.
281. Id. at 424-25.
282. Id. at 424.
283. Id. at 423.
284. Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1325 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining that a
housing inspector's complaints to an outside agency constituted "speech of a concerned citizen").
285. Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 314-16 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an internal
auditor's complaints to the president of the university, the FBI, and the EEOC were not in chain
of command); Frietag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a corrections
officer's complaints to state senator and Inspector General were not in chain of command). But
see Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding no First Amendment protection
for testimony that was closely related to official duties). Davis and Frietagmake it clear that it is
often necessary to separately analyze statements made by a speaker to determine in what capacity
each statement was made. Davis, 518 F.3d at 314; Frietag, 468 F.3d at 544-45; see also
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2007)
(determining that certain instances of speech made by teachers were in the nature of citizen
speech because they occurred after hours, involved citizens and parents not employed by the
school, and involved topics over which the employees lacked supervisory or monitoring duties).
286. Courts often hold that employees have spoken pursuant to job responsibilities in school
settings. See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2009) (concerning a
department chair's opposition to university administration); D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd. of Polk
County, 497 F.3d 1203, 1211-12 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (concerning a principal's speech favoring
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circuits are split on whether such an inquiry is legal, factual, or somewhere in
between.287
Application of the Garcetti rule creates some strange results. As suggested
by Justice Souter, a faculty member complaining about the discriminatory
hiring practices of a university would most likely be speaking as a citizen,
while the personnel director would likely be deemed to be speaking within
official responsibilities. 2 88 Thus, there may be an "inverse correlation"
between one's knowledge of an issue and the degree of First Amendment
289
protection.
Additionally, the idea that faculty members speak only in one
capacity is perhaps too simple. Faculty members teach, research, publish, and
serve the institution, community, and discipline for many reasons. Such
activities enhance one's portfolio of achievements and often further good
citizenship and professional responsibilities. 290 Including protection of a
faculty member's freedom to speak or write as a public citizen as a tenet of
academic freedom has always been controversial.
In the end, however, if
Garcettiapplies to teaching, research, and service, it may be the only tenet that
may be judicially enforced.
In arguing that the Garcetti limitation is too drastic, Justice Souter suggested
requiring the employee speech be of "unusual importance" and satisfy "high
standards of responsibility"; he would then leave it to the Pickering/Connick
balancing test to establish a reasonable balance between the employee's right
to speak out and the employer's right to manage the workplace.
Before
Garcetti, the right to speak out about one's workplace was always qualified;
the issue in Garcetti was whether the additional qualification-that the speech
conversion to charter school); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (concerning an athletic director's memoranda to officials). Williams is
especially instructive because it considered to what extent comments about potential wrongdoing
were part of an employee's job responsibilities. 480 F.3d at 694.
287. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing circuit split).
288. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
289. Robert M. O'Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-GarcettiEnvironment, 7 FIRST AMEND.
L. REv. 1, 6, 12 (2008) (arguing that job-relatedness is really the test for determining if speech is
protected and that First Amendment protection oddly extends to employees when they speak
about matters remote from their areas of expertise).
290. Wright, supra note 276, at 821.
291. Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 14, at 263; Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note
6, at 243-44; VAN ALSTYNE, Specific Theory ofAcademic Freedom, supranote 8, at 63-70. It is
difficult to apply the rationale for academic freedom to the non-professional speech of faculty
members, yet at the same time some limited protection is surely merited if such speech is incident
to professional activities. See Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis, supra note 6, at 244 (suggesting that
a generous definition of professional speech would be better than treating the non-professional
speech of academics differently than that of the public at large). Nonetheless, non-professional
speech accounts for many controversies involving academic freedom. See Jennifer Elrod,
Critical Inquiry: A Tool for Protectingthe Dissident Professor'sAcademic Freedom, 96 CAL. L.
REv. 1669, 1685-86 (2008).
292. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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not be pursuant to official duties-was necessary to ensure workplace
harmony, a consistent message from the employer, and managerial
293
discretion.
The Garcetti limitation is categorical: while it certainly applies
to speech that is patently incorrect, inflammatory, or that compromises the
employer's mission, it may also apply to speech that management would rather
not hear because it exposes wrongdoing. 294 Additionally, the Garcetti
limitation may encourage public employees to voice their concerns not through
the chain of command, but rather outside the chain of command in order to
295
make the case for citizen speech . 9 Of course, a rule that provides incentives
for taking complaints outside the chain of command may be more disruptive
and counterproductive than one that encourages internal complaints.
Apart from issues of content-based discrimination of scholarship and
teaching, it is hard to argue that Garcetti should not be applied in an academic
setting. To be sure, the public university may be a unique employer because
its faculty set the curriculum and are responsible for governance and
scholarship. It is difficult, however, to argue that faculty speech regarding
every facet of university operations should enjoy greater protection than that
afforded to speech of other university staff and government employees. 296 At
the same time, faculty governance depends on faculty participation, and a rule
that has the potential to undermine that participation by making it less likely
that the speech qualifies for constitutional protection could deter participation.
After all, faculty members-as part of their job responsibilities-are expected
to participate in faculty governance for the good of the institution as well as
their related discipline.
F. Conclusion
Public employees have qualified rights to speak out on matters of public
concern. Although the government has always enjoyed greater power to
regulate the speech of its employees, that regulation should be no greater than
is necessary to ensure operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Such

293. Id. at 422-23 (majority opinion) (noting employer interests in controlling speech).
294. Id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 427.
296. See Schauer, supra note 54, at 914-15 (explaining that the desire for job autonomy and
the freedom to dissent is not unique to academic faculty); Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of
Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 840-41 (1987) (advancing arguments that faculty
autonomy as a rationale for academic freedom is questionable and noting that "engineers at
NASA [lack] the constitutional right to engineer rockets in their most efficient, productive, and
self-realizing manner"); see also Keller, supra note 27, at 158, 171-74 (suggesting that the
faculty voice should be dominant in academic and discipline-related matters, but that
contemporary governance should recognize that the university is a large, complex organization in
need of professional management, and faculty may be better deployed in task forces dealing with
all-university problems).
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regulation should not empower administrators to regulate where the sole basis
for doing so is disagreement with the content of the speech.
Given the competing interests inherent in these cases, the Supreme Court has
developed the Pickering/Connicktest, which has proved workable for speech
on matters of public concern. Application of the test requires careful attention
to individual statements, and many statements are simply not of public
concern. Moreover, in protecting the academic freedom of the institution,
courts readily find that much of what teachers do, including discipline-related
speech regarding curriculum and teaching methods, is either not a matter of
public concern or is within the prerogative of the institution; thus, a balance is
struck in favor of the institution. Discipline-related speech outside the
classroom may also be subject to institutional regulation where it strongly
contravenes institutional norms.
Garcetti added a new requirement in this area: the speech must involve the
public employee speaking as a citizen and must not be pursuant to the
employee's job responsibilities. 297 It is an open question whether this applies
in the academic context to scholarship and teaching. Even if it does, a faculty
member may be able to claim that he or she was speaking as a citizen by going
outside the chain of command and otherwise taking action consistent with
citizen speech.
Garcetti does create some anomalies. The capacity in which the employee
complains becomes all-important, and those complaints made outside of one's
job responsibilities-and about which the speaker would presumably have less
knowledge-are more likely to be protected than complaints by a person in a
position to know about the situation by virtue of job responsibilities.
Additionally, to the extent that faculty members are expected to contribute to
faculty governance, such speech would be unprotected, and an analysis under
the Pickering/Connick test would be unnecessary.
This result certainly
suggests that the speech is less protected and that Garcetti provides a
disincentive to participation.
In light of the above, the Garcetti limitation presents another barrier to
advancing academic freedom claims involving the teaching and scholarship of
faculty members. As an academic enterprise, a university makes content-based
decisions affecting both of these areas; concern arises when such decisions are
made upon non-academic grounds, including mere disagreement with the
message. Such actions may result in the suppression of speech and may have a
chilling effect. Freedom of inquiry is important; while most universities
require faculty members to pursue research and scholarship, they do not
regulate the creative process and often do not claim ownership of the work,
Additionally, a faculty member's discipline benefits from more speech, and
peer review and critique by others in the same discipline is a better means of
accepting or rejecting the work of the faculty member. Although constitutional
297.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
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protection may be the most desirable outcome, the following Part suggests
other remedies to combat retaliation based on speech or creative work.
III. IDENTIFYING OTHER PROTECTIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

In Garcetti, the Court recognized that employees often serve a valuable
function by speaking out to "[e]xpos[e] .. .inefficiency and misconduct" and

suggested that other mechanisms apart from the First Amendment may serve to
promote such functions. 298 Several mechanisms are available in the academic
setting, the strongest of which is tenure because of its procedural and
substantive guarantees that may be of a constitutional dimension. The
problem, however, is that relatively few faculty members enjoy tenure. Other
sources of protection include contracts, academic regulations, collectivebargaining agreements, state-law retaliatory discharge provisions, and other
state-law constitutional protections.
A. Tenure

According to the AAUP, the purpose of tenure is to facilitate academic
"freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities" and to provide
"a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to
men and women of ability." 299 Essentially, tenure is awarded to teachers after
their successful completion of a probationary period and it ensures that
teachers will not be dismissed without cause, except for unusual financial
circumstances. 30 A tenured status permits one to be dismissed only on a
finding of just cause or "financial exigency," and it guarantees procedural due
process prior to any such dismissal.3 °1
The nature of tenure has been explored in the context of public university
faculty members asserting constitutional due process claims in the wake of
termination or other adverse employment actions. Tenure also has been
considered in a series of cases addressing whether tenure buyout payments
constitute "wages" and are thus subject to federal employment taxes, or
whether they merely constitute payments in exchange for a property right and
298. Id.at 425-26.
299. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 3.
300. Id.at 4. With the elimination of age-based mandatory retirement, termination of tenured
faculty cannot be justified based on a set retirement age. VALERIE MARTIN CONLEY, AM. ASS'N
OF UNIV. PROFESSORS (AAUP), SURVEY OF CHANGES IN FACULTY RETIREMENT POLICIES 1
(2007), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/36818073-DDAE-4CFC-B 158-41Al 524
D62E3/0/AAUP2007RetirementReport.pdf. Tenured positions have no defined term or agerelated end point and departure is primarily at the discretion of the faculty member.
301. Id As noted, dismissal could also be based on discontinuance of a program of study or
a department due to educational considerations as determined by the faculty or by clear and
convincing evidence of physical or mental disability. See Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678
N.W.2d 163, 167 (N.D. 2004) (quoting Stensrud v. Mayville State Coll., 368 N.W.2d 519, 521
n.l (N.D. 1985)) (reviewing termination for cause of a tenured faculty member and noting that
the primary purpose of tenure is to preserve academic freedom).
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therefore are not subject to federal employment taxes. 30 2 As part of their
analyses, the cases consider whether the faculty member has a property right in
continued employment with the university. 3 03 The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. '3°4 Thus, a state may not deprive someone of a
property interest without due process of law. There are two types of due
process: procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due
process ensures that the state will not deprive a person of property without fair
procedures in order to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations, while
substantive due process protects against arbitrary government action regarding
certain fundamental rights, regardless of the procedures. 0 5 It is important to

302. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 166 (3d Cir. 2007)
(payments to university faculty in exchange for relinquishing tenure rights constitute wages);
Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 2006) (payments to public school teachers
in exchange for relinquishing tenure rights granted automatically by statute constitute wages);
N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 600, 603 (8th Cir. 2001) (payments to university
faculty in exchange for relinquishing tenure rights do not constitute wages). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that tenure is the beginning of a new employment
relationship, rather than a reward for past service, and that the buyout payments were made in
exchange for relinquishment of "constitutional and contractual rights to tenure." N.D. State
Univ., 255 F.3d at 606-07. Thus, the payments were not wages subject to employment taxes. Id.
at 600. On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit focused on
how tenure is earned, and held that tenure buyout payments are compensation for past services,
notwithstanding the fact that the grant of tenure is discretionary. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at
173-74; accord Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 195. A current revenue ruling probably would classify
most tenure buyout payments as wages for past services; only where "the employee provides
clear, separate, and adequate consideration for the employer's payment that is not dependent upon
the employer-employee relationship and its component terms and conditions" will the payment
not constitute wages. Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-50 I.R.B. 961; see also Robert J. Tepper & Craig
G. White, Academic Early Retirement: Do Tenure Buyout Payments Warrant Unique
Employment Tax Treatment?, 35 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2010); Nicole
Occhuizzo, Taxing Tenure: An Examination of How the Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) Has Been Applied to Tenure Buyouts, 62 TAx LAW. 189, 220 (2008).
These cases are useful because they illustrate common features of tenure. Generally, there is a
probationary period in which a faculty member must demonstrate proficiency in teaching,
research, and service before being considered for tenure. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 166,
173-74; id.at 177 (Scirica, J., dissenting); N.D. State. Univ., 255 F.3d at 605-06. The
probationary period extends for a number of years, and if tenure is not granted, the faculty
member may be terminated. Univ. of Pittsburgh,507 F.3d at 166 (majority opinion); N.D. State
Univ., 255 F.3d at 601; see also Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that a five-year probationary period applied). As previously discussed, courts tend to
defer to institutional decisions concerning tenure and promotion. See supra notes 57-66 and
accompanying text.
303. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 576-78 (1972).
304. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
305. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Courts are divided on whether a
tenured faculty member has substantive due process protection in continued employment. Some
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note that procedural due process does not guarantee any particular outcome,
such as guaranteeing that a tenured faculty member will not be terminated;
rather, its essence is the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
06
concerning the adverse action.
A faculty member claiming a violation of due process in connection with an
interest in continued employment must establish a protectable property interest
under state law. 30 7 Because the Constitution does not define what constitutes a
property interest, one must establish a "legitimate claim of entitlement" rather
than a unilateral expectation. 30 Property is not limited to tangible personal or
real property. 30 9 It more broadly includes "interests that a person has already
3 10
acquired in specific benefits."
A faculty member has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment given a written contract with a tenure provision providing for
termination only for cause. 311 That said, rules and informal agreements can
also demonstrate property interests, and other universit employees may have
property interests in their own continued employment. 3 f 2 Thus, it is important
to look not only to faculty contracts but also to faculty handbooks, academic
regulations, past conduct, and other sources to determine whether the faculty
member has a property interest in employment. The essence of tenure is a

courts have concluded that there is no substantive due process right, reasoning that such
employment is not a fundamental right to which substantive due process would attach and that
federal law already provides a claim for retaliatory discharge in contravention of the First
Amendment. See Nicholas v. Penn. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 143 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Parate v.
Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 832-33 (6th Cir. 1989). Other courts have found that substantive due
process rights do attach to tenure. N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 605; Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of
Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998).
306. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). There may be other state procedural
due process protections, but the due process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment is judged
on federal constitutional standards.
307. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. A faculty member at a state university may also have a liberty
interest in pursuing other employment opportunities upon termination or non-renewal. Id.at 573.
This interest may be infringed where a state university publicly discloses false and stigmatizing
reasons for the termination or non-renewal, without providing the faculty member advance notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Id.at 573; Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 470 (2d Cir. 2001). To
prevail on such a claim, the faculty member would have to show that other employment
opportunities were foreclosed and that the statements went beyond defamation and involved false
charges of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or other similar claims. Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents, 274
F.3d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir. 2001); Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669-72 (7th Cir. 2001).
A property interest in continued employment is not a prerequisite for a liberty interest claim. See
Sciolino v. City of Newport News, 480 F.3d 642, 645-46 (4th Cir. 2007).
308. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77.
309. Id at 571-72.
310. Id.at 576.
311. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
312. Seeid. at 601-02.
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restriction on 31the
discretion of the university employer in matters of
3
reappointment.
As a result, courts are reluctant to find a property interest based on the
criteria and procedures leading to tenure or reappointment of probationary
faculty; the procedures in place should not be confused with an actual
31 4
restriction on the university's power to appoint a particular candidate.
However, for those faculty members awarded tenure, the university stands on
different ground, and a faculty member could certainly be entitled to due
process procedures when alleging that termination was based on protected
speech.
Tenure protects academic freedom because "[i]t provides a secure
forum for the germination, cultivation, and exchange of ideas without fear that
expression of viewpoints will result in retribution."3 16 At the core of that
protection are contract-based restrictions on the discretion regarding
reappointment, and constitutional due process protections on how that
reappointment power is exercised. 317 The procedural protections incident to
tenure often will require the institution to come up with legitimate reasons for
its actions; such reasons will be made public, making it more difficult to
terminate a faculty member for advocating unpopular views. 31 8 While it might
be theoretically possible to protect academic freedom solely through contractbased restrictions (requiring that employment decisions be made based upon
professional and educational concerns) involving peer review, at a minimum
some protection in the nature of tenure would be necessary
to insulate the
319
decision-makers from political and institutional pressure.
A contractual restriction on the power to reappoint, and therefore a
constitutional right to procedural due process, is generally lacking for the
majority of the academic workforce. From 1975 to 2007, the percentage of
full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty declined from 56.8% to 31.2% of
university academic employees. 320 Along with the decline of appointments
leading to tenure has been the rise of contingent faculty-faculty who teach

313. See Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2003).
314. Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1992); Lovelace v. Se.
Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 422-24 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
315. By itself,
the First Amendment does not require notice and an opportunity to be heard
merely to ensure that the free speech rights of university faculty are protected. Roth, 408 U.S. at
575 n.14.
316. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 606 (8th Cir. 2001).
317. Id.at 605-06. Many courts and universities have endorsed the purpose of tenure as set
forth by the AAUP. Otero-Burgos v. Inter Am. Univ., 558 F.3d 1,10 n.24 (1 st Cir. 2009).
318. Byrne, Special Concern, supra note 14, at 266.
319. Byrne, Academic Freedom Without Tenure, supra note 13, at 13.
320. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Trends in Faculty Status, 1975-2007, http://www.aaup.
org/NR/rdonlyres/7D0 IEOC7-C255-41 F 1-9F II -E27D0028CB2A/0/TrendsinFacultyStatus
2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter AAUP Trends].
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part-time or full-time but without tenure. 321 In 2007, these contingent faculty
members comprised almost sixty-nine percent of faculty employees. 322 Of
course, this trend portends consequences for the academic environment;
although contingent faculty add a practical dimension to the academy and work
for less than the tenured or tenure-track faculty, the arrangement rarely allows
for participation in research or faculty development, let alone faculty
governance. 323 Appointments from semester-to-semester or year-to-year
counsel against free expression, particularly expression concerning the
appointing authority, by this sub-group of the academic workforce. 324 Yet
such free expression is essential to academic freedom. Courts and academics
are keenly aware of the difference between tenure-track and non-tenure-track
appointments, 325 although this may be ameliorated somewhat through limited
contractual protections short of tenure, such as326notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to dismissal or non-reappointment.
B. Academic Regulations
In addition to relying upon procedural due process protections, faculty faced
with retaliatory dismissal may also be able to rely upon certain substantive
provisions adopted by the university. A public university's operational
guidelines often incorporate parts of the AAUP's recommended academic
regulations, which are designed "to protect academic freedom and tenure and
to ensure academic due process. ' 327 For those who enjoy tenure and may only

321. John W. Curtis & Monica F. Jacobe, Consequences: An Increasingly Contingent
Faculty, in AAUP CONTINGENT FACULTY INDEx 2006 5 (2006), availableat http://www.aaup.
org/NR/rdonlyres/FO5FF88E-B2A8-4052-8373-AFOFDAE060AC/0/ConsequencesAnIncreasingI
yContingentFaculty.pdf.
322. AAUP Trends, supra note 320, at 312.
323. Curtis & Jacobe, supra note 321, at 6-7.
324. Joe Berry & Elizabeth Hoffman, Including Contingent Faculty in Governance,
ACADEME ONLINE, Nov.-Dec. 2008, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2008/ND
/Feat/berr.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (noting that most contingent faculty are at-will or
virtually at-will employees who run a great risk of publicly disagreeing with tenure and tenuretrack colleagues and concluding that job security is essential to inclusion).
325. See Keri v. Bd. of Trs., 458 F.3d 620, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that tenured and
non-tenured faculty are not similarly situated and are subject to different standards); Weinstein v.
Univ. of Ill.,
811 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no property interest in reappointment);
McElearney v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 612 F.2d 285, 290-92 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding
that probationary employee had no property interest); see also Otero-Burgos v. Inter Am. Univ.,
558 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting the difference between at-will employees and tenured
professors who are not subject to temporal limitations but who presumptively may serve until
retirement).
326. Ernest Benjamin, Contingent Faculty Organizing and Representation, in ACADEMIC
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 112, 129-30 (Ernest Benjamin & Michael Mauer eds., 2006).
327. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Foreword to RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL
REGULATIONS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM & TENURE 1(2007), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/
43B77A60-BA80-4155-B61B-FF76743B5048/0/RecommendedlnstitutionalRegulationsonAcade
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be dismissed for cause, the regulations provide that "[a]dequate cause for a
dismissal will be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty
members in their professional capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal
will not be used to restrain faculty members in their exercise of academic
freedom or other rights of American citizens." 328 The regulations further
declare that "[a]ll members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled
to academic freedom as set forth in the 1940 Statement" and provide a hearing
procedure when a faculty member alleges that the decision not to reappoint
was based upon considerations that violate academic freedom. 32 The AAUP
also provides information and advice on apparent violations of academic
33
freedom; in certain cases, a formal investigation and report may occur. 0
Additionally, a school's accrediting body may also insist upon some
protection of academic freedom. For example, the American Bar Association,
which accredits nearly 200 law schools, requires that a "law school shall have
an established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and
33 1
tenure" and provides an example based upon the AAUP's 1940 Statement.
Likewise, a regional accrediting body may require some evidence of a policy
of academic freedom.332
C. Other Measures
Provisions protecting academic freedom may be incorporated not only in
faculty contracts and academic regulations, 333 but also in collective-bargaining
micFreedomandTenure.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter AAUP Recommended
Institutional Regulations].
328. Id. at 4.
329. Id. at 6-7.
330. See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Investigative Reports, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/
protect/academicfreedon/investrep/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
331. See AM. BAR ASS'N 2009-2010 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS std.
405(b), http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009StandardsWebContent/Chapter/ 204.
pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); see also AM. BAR ASS'N 2009-2010 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL
OF LAW SCHOOLS app. 1, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009StandardsWeb
Content/AppendixlAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Additionally,
the membership requirements of the Association of American Law Schools provide that a
"faculty member shall have academic freedom and tenure in accordance with the principles of the
[AAUP]." BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, INC. art. 6, § 6-6(d),
http://www.aals.org/about-handbook bylaws.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
332. See, e.g., HIGHER LEARNING COMM'N, HANDBOOK OF ACCREDITATION §§ 3.1-5, 3.213 (3d ed. 2003), available at http://www.ncahlc.org/download/Handbook03.pdf (discussing
Criterion 4 and Core Component 4a and indicating that an organization must demonstrate that it
values a life of learning, evidenced by the fact that the board has, among other things, "approved
and disseminated statements supporting freedom of inquiry").
333. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, supra note 175, at 1348-49 (noting that most institutions
commit to a guarantee of academic freedom and that professional academic freedom is not
restricted by certain constitutional requirements, such as the requirements that the speech be on a
matter of public concern or that it not be pursuant to employment responsibilities). Recognizing
that constitutional academic freedom may be insufficient to protect faculty, an AAUP
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agreements, 334 state-law retaliatory discharge provisions, 335 and other state-law

constitutional protections. In Garcetti, the Court implied that even if First
Amendment protection was unavailable, government employers should be
mindful of employee complaints given a "powerful network of legislative
enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codesavailable to those who seek to expose wrongdoing."336 Many states recognize
that penalizing whistleblowers who report violations of federal, state, or local
law contravenes public policy. 337 The problem, however, is that there is a wide
variation in who and what is covered because a uniform law is lacking. 338 For
example, some schemes condition protection on notifying a supervisor before
engaging in the protected activity, while others prohibit supervisors from
imposing such conditions. 339 This lack of uniformity probably contributes to
difficulties in making the academic community generally aware, but the
important point here is that such laws do exist and may affect conduct. In any
event, should the speech involve opposition to discrimination, federal law
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has spoken
340
.out against that discrimination.
It is important to sound one note of caution in this area: exhaustion of any
administrative remedy may be required. Several cases have held that a faculty
member cannot assert certain rights when administrative mechanisms exist to

Subcommittee has proposed alternative policies for incorporation into academic regulations and
agreements. AAUP Subcommittee Report, supra note 25 1, at 87-88. The policies are "designed
to clarify that academic freedom protects faculty speech about institutional academic matters and
governance, as well as teaching, research and extramural statements." Id.at 87. They differ in
specificity as to defining faculty responsibility for such speech. Id.
334. See, e.g., Nalichowski v. Capshaw, No. 95-5577, 1996 WL 548143, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 20, 1996) (holding that violations of a collective-bargaining agreement containing an
academic freedom provision were grievable); see also Gorum v. Sessoms, No. 06-565, 2008 WL
399641, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2008) (discussing the procedure required to terminate a tenured
faculty member under a collective bargaining agreement), aff'd, 561 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir.
2009). Frequently, the collective bargaining agreement will incorporate academic freedom norms
and protect academic freedom through detailed appointment, retention and termination
provisions. Ernest Benjamin, The Collective Agreement: Negotiating Redbook Principles, in
ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 242, 261-62 (Ernest Benjamin & Michael Mauer eds.,
2006).
335. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 425-26.
338. Id. at 440-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
339. Id.at 440.
340. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who
oppose or testify to unlawful practices); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination following employee speech regarding "unlawful employment practice[s]"). See
generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (construing § 2000e3(a) as applying not only to employment-related acts or acts that occur in the workplace).
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address such issues in the first instance. 34 1 Not having taken advantage of the
it is difficult to argue later that the procedure and the result
procedure in place,
342
inadequate.
are
Other remedies might include state constitutional or statutory provisions; for
example, a faculty member could file a claim under the state's equivalent of
the First Amendment, and a state court might not be inclined to adopt the
Garcetti limitation or may have a more expansive view of academic freedom
343
than under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Likewise, a state may guarantee due process, both procedural and substantive.
No matter the remedy, the key is to look for guarantees of free speech,
procedural due process, and protection against arbitrary action.
D. Conclusion
The most well-known mechanism for the protection of academic freedom is
the First Amendment. The Garcetti Court implicitly recognized that other
mechanisms may protect employees who speak out, even if they do so pursuant
to their job responsibilities. This is especially true in the academic area; most
institutions have adopted some form of procedure for academic personnel.
While a federal constitutional right to due process depends on a property
interest in employment (tenure, for example, in the case of faculty members),
state law constitutional or statutory provisions, collective bargaining, or
university provisions may provide a guarantee of due process or academic
freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professional academic freedom and tenure are important aspects of a
university environment that encourage both freedom of inquiry and leaming.
Academic freedom for public university faculty extends to research and
publication, discipline-related speech, and speaking out as citizens. Tenure
protects academic freedom because it restricts the discretion of university
personnel and provides that tenured faculty will be terminated only for just
cause or financial exigency, rather than for unpopular speech.

341. See, e.g., Neiman v. Yale Univ., 851 A.2d 1165, 1172 (Conn. 2004) (arguing that lack
of such requirements would "undermine the internal grievance procedure" that relies on the
assumption that the institutions themselves are the best forums to handle such disputes and that
"internal procedures do not preclude access to the courts").
342. Reilly v. City of At. City, 532 F.3d 216, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2008); Santana v. City of
Tulsa, 359 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
343. Not surprisingly, state constitutional provisions concerning free speech often follow the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 n.4 (C.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff's liberty interest was the same under both the state and federal
constitutions); Mills v. W. Wash. Univ., 208 P.3d 13, 20-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (analyzing
academic freedom under both federal and state law).
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Academic freedom is a relatively new constitutional doctrine and has
important limitations. Academic freedom is a "special concern" of the First
Amendment, not a rule of decision. The First Amendment generally must be
the source of rights used to vindicate speech. In addition, though initially
concerned with individual faculty rights, academic freedom has taken on a
decidedly institutional character: it protects the freedom of the institution to
decide internal matters including selection of personnel, curriculum, and
teaching methods. As such, academic freedom is often a default principlecourts tend not to interfere in academic matters and to defer to the institution
where possible.
The First Amendment protects against retaliation for engaging in protected
speech. Academic personnel may speak out on matters involving teaching,
research, and service, but it would be a mistake to think that all such speech is
protected under the rubric of academic freedom, let alone under the First
Amendment. First, the state has far more power to regulate the speech of its
employees than its citizens, given that it is hiring those engaging in the speech
and is necessarily concerned with operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly been challenged as to how to
achieve a balance between the rights of the state employer to run its operation
successfully and the First Amendment rights of employees to speak out. It has
determined that when employees act more like citizens than like employees,
the First Amendment may protect speech on matters ofpublic concern. Speech
on matters of purely personal interest, such as internal complaints, is not
protected. Moreover, even for speech on a matter of public concern, the right
is qualified. The state may prove that its interest in avoiding actual disruption
of the workplace outweighs the employee's right to speak out, or the state may
prove that even absent the employee's protected speech, it still would have
terminated the employee. This framework has been applied in a variety of
employment contexts, and courts have been reluctant to alter it in the academic
setting for fear of elevating the rights of state academic personnel above other
personnel.
In 2006, the Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which it held that speech
pursuant to one's official duties is not protected from employer discipline.344
This test precedes other inquiries in the framework, and in creating it, the
Court reserved comment on whether this rule applies to speech related to
scholarship or teaching. Because suppression of speech involving research and
scholarship has the greatest potential to involve content-based limitations and
is central to the university's mission, there is good reason not to apply it in
these contexts. Even if the Garcetti limitation does apply, a faculty member
may be able to avoid it by demonstrating that he or she was acting as a
citizen-for example, by complaining outside the chain of command. The
Garcetti limitation is grounded in the idea that public employees should not be
344.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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better off than those in the private sector with regard to employer discretion
over job performance.
The Garcetti limitation, however, creates some odd results: those most
knowledgeable about an issue because of job responsibilities frequently do not
Additionally, the
enjoy protection for statements that are job-related.
limitation as applied may mean that statements pursuant to faculty governance
responsibilities are unprotected. Such a possibility could deter participation.
Even if the limitation applies, tenure, with its customary guarantee of
academic freedom and dismissal only for just cause, provides some protection
against arbitrary action for those relatively few faculty members with such
status. That said, all academic employees may want to consider remedies apart
from federal constitutional protection-such as state constitutional and
statutory protection, collective bargaining agreements, contracts, and
university policy reflected in academic regulations-when it comes to
employer discipline based on speech.
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